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Abstract 
 
Jeffrey Dressel, M.A. 
 
Department of Psychology, May 2008 
 
University of Kansas 
 
 
This dissertation discusses design elements that should be utilized for optimal 
measurement of dual task performance, and reviews literature suggesting that these 
elements are underutilized. Participants seem to be able to effectively “tune out” one 
or the other task in a dual task paradigm, though traditional analyses and POC 
analyses converge to inform us that under these experimental conditions (which may 
not require adequate cognitive load), UFOV performance is not as greatly impacted 
by concurrent verbal tasks as pilot data and theory suggest. While smaller than 
expected, these dual task costs have implications in an applied setting, as 19% of 
subjects exhibited UFOV scores under dual task conditions that would predict more 
than double the risk of injurious accident. Finally, highly arousing negatively valent 
verbal stimuli may lead to greatest interference with visual attention performance. 
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This dissertation makes contributions to both the applied and basic science fields. 
As a basic science goal, the experiments investigate to what degree the emotional content 
of verbal stimuli might change patterns of attentional resource allocation and salience of 
visual stimuli. As an applied science goal, the same experiments investigate the role this 
diminished visual attention performance may play in accident risk to drivers conversing 
on cellular phones. 
There is compelling evidence to support the notion that emotional stimuli, 
especially when negatively emotionally valent, may be especially capable of diminishing 
visual attention performance. Thus, it is important to investigate this interference effect to 
inform both applied and basic science.  
In order to investigate these effects thoroughly, certain methodological protocol 
should be adopted. Performance operating characteristics (POC curves) describe the 
ability to perform two tasks concurrently in greater statistical resolution than the static, 
equal priority dual-task methods we have used to collect pilot data. Additionally, the 
POC paradigm allows one’s ability to trade-off prioritization of performance between the 
two tasks to be measured. This is important because it answers the common question of a 
driver’s ability to simply “prioritize” the driving task (i.e., visual attention). It may be the 
case that some verbal information is especially difficult to attenuate, or to “set” to a low 
level of priority; this research explores that possibility.  
Rationale 
The Useful Field of View (UFOV) 
Atchley, P. and Dressel (2004) described that the functional, or useful, field of 
view (UFOV) is a cognitive mechanism that may be capable of accounting for increased 
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accident rates for drivers conversing on a cellular phone. The functional field of view is a 
subset of the entire visual field present at any given eye fixation that can be processed to 
the level of ability to guide action. The functional field of view is assessed using a dual-
task paradigm of visual search for a target within a large region of visual space, with the 
addition of a concurrent visual task at the foveal location. For example, an observer is 
typically asked to make a judgment (e.g., the detection of a visual feature) about a target 
that appears at the center of the visual field while concurrently detecting the location 
(radial direction) of a second peripheral target. In addition, distracting information can be 
presented at peripheral locations to compete with the peripheral target for selection. As 
the central task becomes more demanding, as distractors are added, and as the duration of 
presentation is decreased, some observers show a decline in the ability to accurately 
detect the peripheral target, indicating that the field of view within which they can 
accurately extract information has decreased.  
Reductions in the functional field of view have been shown to occur in some 
persons at an advanced age (Ball & Owsley, 1991; Ball, Owsley, Stalvey, Roenker, 
Sloane & Graves, 1998). These reductions have been shown to reliably predict an 
increase in accident risk, with a 40% reduction in the functional field of view effectively 
doubling accident risk (Owsley, et al. (1998). These results were replicated by Ball, et al. 
(2006), who demonstrated that low performance on subtest 2 of the UFOV test (divided 
attention task, 353ms or longer) was associated a relative accident risk of 2.02. This 
finding was comparable to other predictors that were investigated by Ball, et al. (2006). 
These other predictors included the Closure subtest of the Motor Free Visual Perception 
Test (MVPT), which involves choosing from a set of incomplete pictures which exemplar 
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would match a given complete picture, and part B of the Trail Making Test, which 
involves using a pencil to connect a sequence of alternating integers and letters. Further 
support for the usefulness of the UFOV in predicting accident rate is provided by 
Hoffman, et al. (2005), who found in their sample of 155 adults that UFOV (subtest 2 and 
3, divided attention and selective attention) performance was unrelated to on-road 
accident risk, but a modest predictor of driving simulator performance. Receiver 
operating characteristics (ROC curves) revealed greatest sensitivity of 85% classification 
as “at risk” with 45% false positive rate. The UFOV has been demonstrated to be a 
consistent, reliable predictor of motor vehicle accidents of older adults. Edwards, et al. 
(2005) report test-retest reliability for PC versions of the UFOV test as high (r= 0.735 for 
a touch-screen interface, as we employ in our research), and as having high correlation 
with standard, “professional” versions of the test (r= .0746 for a touch-screen interface).  
Although the UFOV appears to be a valid and reliable predictor of accident risk in 
older adults, there is debate as to the cognitive or perceptual mechanism employed during 
UFOV performance. Whereas Sekuler and Ball (1986) and Ball et al., (1988) have 
interpreted decreased UFOV performance as a constriction of the UFOV, adopting a 
spatial attention, or “spotlight” metaphor, this position may not be readily adopted by all 
researchers using the UFOV test. For example, Seiple et al. (1996) suggested that UFOV 
performance could be related to other stimulus conditions than merely eccentricity of the 
peripheral targets, such as backward masking, presence of distractors, and luminance. In 
a series of experiments parametrically varying these factors, these researchers found that 
masking and distractor presence affected UFOV performance (consistent with the 
intended design of the UFOV test), but that luminance and target eccentricity had no 
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effect on test performance. That is, the eccentricity of the peripheral target (in UFOV 
subtests 2 and 3) had no effect on target detection, while presence of distractors did have 
an effect on target detection. Thus, Seiple et al. (1996) conclude that UFOV performance 
decrements do not reflect a constriction of a region of visual attention, but rather, a 
higher-order cognitive performance decrement, such as executive function decline, or 
decrease in complex visual search performance. Furthermore, Sekuler, Bennet, and 
Mamelak (2000) have reached similar conclusions. These researchers found no 
eccentricity-dependent performance decrements, and conclude that UFOV decline is best 
conceptualized as a decrease in efficiency with which older subjects are able to extract 
information from a cluttered scene, rather than strictly a constriction of visual spatial 
attention.  
The notion that UFOV performance decrements in older adults may be explained 
as an inability to extract relevant information from a field of irrelevant information, or an 
inability to effectively utilize an executive function to prioritize relevant information, is 
consistent with notions of dual-task performance couched in a general resource theory 
(see below). That is, if the UFOV test is viewed as a complex cognitive task, and not a 
lower-order perceptual task, it follows that the UFOV may more readily be interfered 
with by cognitively demanding tasks, such as concurrent conversations (or verbal tasks). 
To preview, it may be the case that cognitive demands of conversation-like tasks deplete 
general cognitive resources such that adequate resources are not available to perform the 
UFOV task at short presentation durations and thus, attend to visual information while 
driving. 
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This rationale led Atchley, P. and Dressel (2004) to an investigation of the impact 
of verbal tasks on the functional field of view. Using a functional field of view testing 
apparatus and a highly controlled verbal task, it was found that none of the younger 
adults yielded UFOV scores predicting an increased risk category when performing the 
functional field of view task in isolation. However, adding a concurrent verbal task 
yielded a considerable reduction in the functional field of view in the 18-25 year old 
subjects. All participants at least were categorized as showing “some difficulty with 
divided attention” category while few were categorized as “extremely impaired”. 
Applying the accident risk norms to the functional field of view performance of the 
younger observers in the concurrent verbal task condition led to the prediction that 6% of 
the participants were about 16 times more likely to have an injurious accident. 
Subsequent unpublished studies by Dressel and Atchley, P. have investigated the 
relative effects of different verbal tasks (i.e., different categories of words, different 
memory and linguistic processing demands) on the UFOV. Directional verbal tasks have 
yielded compelling results which, given the directional aspect of the UFOV task, is 
consistent with a theory of common code interference proposed by Wickens’ (2002) 
multiple resource model of attention. Wickens’ (2002) model suggests that processing 
signals using similar “codes”, or related information, may produce greater cross-talk 
interference than processing signals carrying unrelated information. However, the largest 
interference effects observed to date appear to be the product of proto-conversational 
content consisting of negative emotional valence. The theoretical implications of these 
findings as well as the findings themselves, are described in greater detail below. 
Emotion and Attention 
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Researchers attempting to investigate emotion may face unique challenges. For 
instance, some researchers suggest that there is a vague understanding of what is meant 
by “emotion”, and that the terms commonly used to label emotional experiences do not 
adequately and exclusively map onto physiological and psychological phenomena (e.g., 
Davidson & van Reekum, 2005). That is, an emotion commonly referred to as “fear” may 
include such different psychological states as apprehension, panic, a startle response, 
feelings of inferiority, and more. Thus, it is important to note that any discussion of 
emotion in research literatures may be subject to this vague interpretation. 
Research investigating “cue utilization”, conducted in the 1950’s suggests that as 
stress increases, the use of cues for performing tasks decreases. For example, Callaway 
and Thompson (1953) evoked in participants a negative emotional state and subsequently 
asked these participants to perform a number of size and distance matching tasks. 
Reduced accuracy on these tasks while experiencing negative emotion was suggested to 
be due to decreased use of peripheral cues or, to use current terminology, a reduction of 
attention. In a review, Easterbrook (1959) notes a number of studies suggesting that stress 
results in a “shrinkage of the perceptive field” (page 180). While these studies predate the 
classic notions of spatial attention, they do suggest that experiencing negative emotion 
may have a negative impact on attention. 
More recently, research has suggested a distinction between two dimensions of 
emotional stimuli: arousal and valence. These dimensions have unique effects, both 
physiologically and behaviorally (Heller & Nitschke, 1998; Lang, Greenwald, Bradley & 
Hamm, 1993). Arousal refers to the perceived intensity of the stimulus, and is typically 
rated from “low” to “high”. Valence refers to a general pleasantness dimension and is 
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rated from the polar “pleasant” or “positive” to “unpleasant” or “negative” (e.g., for most 
individuals, “rainbow” is a positively valent image or word, and “malaria” is a negatively 
valent image or word). 
The valence dimension of emotional stimuli has received great attention by the 
scientific community. Heller and colleagues (e.g., Heller, 1990; Heller, Nitschke, & 
Lindsay, 1997) have suggested that valence and arousal dimensions may be processed in 
different regions of the brain. Specifically, these researchers have found that valence 
seems to be processed in the anterior regions, with positive valence displaying more 
activity in right than left hemispheres, and negative valence displaying more activity in 
left than right hemispheres. Furthermore, the arousal dimension appears to be processed 
in the right parietotemporal region, in addition to being processed in subcortical 
structures. 
Some specific regions of the brain that have been associated with emotional 
information processing have been demonstrated to be active during visual attention tasks. 
Thus, shared neurophysiological resources suggest a biological foundation for the large 
interference effect of emotional stimuli on visual attention. The amygdala, which projects 
to visual areas V1 and V2, is more active when participants view emotional faces than 
faces expressing no, or less, emotion (Pessoa & Ungerleider, 2002). Also, the anterior 
cingulate gyrus has been shown to integrate emotion and attention, and thus may be a 
source of processing limitations (Yamasaki, LaBar, & McCarthy, 2002). 
Bradley, et al (2003), using fMRI, have found elevated BOLD levels in the occipital 
lobe while participants view emotion-laden scenes, such as those depicting physical 
violence and threat, relative to scenes with equal visual complexity, but lower subjective 
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ratings of emotional content. Thus, vision centers in the brain may experience greater 
activity, or readiness, when emotional content is viewed.  
The effect of emotion on attention may be especially strong in clinical populations. 
Atchley, R., Ilardi, and Enloe (2003), using a divided visual field paradigm, found that 
depressed and previously depressed subjects showed a speed and accuracy benefit for 
making valence judgments of negatively valent words primarily processed by the right 
hemisphere. Non-depressed control subjects showed the opposite effect, displaying an 
advantage for positively valent words. Thus, experience of a depressed mood (here, in a 
clinical context, not an induced context as in other studies) may increase a readiness to 
process negative emotional information. 
In addition to a neurophysiological foundation for the interaction of emotion and 
attention, there is support for a theoretical perspective that describes the interaction of 
emotional experience and visual attention. Davidson (2003) refers to this emotion-
contingent activity as “motivated attention”. Motivated attention involves the orienting, 
or priming, of our perceptual systems to process threat-related (i.e., emotional) 
information. Ellis (2005) describes emotion as an early mechanism that is capable of 
motivating individuals to have a propensity to process information in the environment 
that suggests something is risky, or “off” (p. 28). This motivation mechanism allows 
information relevant to survival to be prioritized above other information, and to enter 
our conscious awareness more readily than information not related to threats. Some 
researchers (e.g., Davison, 2003; Levenson, 2003) suggest that such a mechanism could 
have an evolutionary advantage, as heightening awareness of threats in the environment 
would promote survival.  
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 Motivated attention has been observed in a variety of tasks in which emotion 
modulates cognition. Bower (1981) employed a flanker task in which a to-be-
remembered emotional (pleasant, unpleasant) target word was presented centrally, with 
emotional flanker words surrounding the target. Subjects showed less ability to inhibit the 
processing of flankers matching the mood they had been induced to experience (i.e., 
subjects in a pleasant mood were less likely to inhibit pleasant words). This is consistent 
with a theory of motivated attention suggesting that the experience of emotion can 
“prime” the processing emotional content presented to an individual, or orient an 
attentional system to emotional information.  
Similarly, Calvo, Castillo, and Fuentes (2006) employed a lexical decision task in 
which central and parafoveal probes/primes varied in emotional valence scores. 
Emotional state of the participants was manipulated by interleaving the display of 
emotional scenes between trials (in a within-subject design, thus, a single participant 
would be induced into either a positive or threat-laden negative mood). Results indicated 
greater interference effects of the parafoveal probe if the probe matched the emotional 
state of the participant. That is, participants were less likely to attenuate negative stimuli 
if they had been induced to feel negative emotion, as if their attentional mechanisms had 
been oriented to process negative information. 
Further support for the effect of emotion on attention has been demonstrated by 
Schupp, et al. (2004). In these studies, subjects viewed pictures from the International 
Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2001). Content of the 
pictures was varied, with subjects viewing 25 pleasant pictures, 10 neutral pictures, and 
25 unpleasant pictures. Additionally, a white noise startle probe was presented with one 
10 
of two stimulus onset asynchronies (SOA; 2.5s or 4.5s). Researchers found that P3 event-
related potentials (ERPs), thought to be an indicator of processing “oddball”, or startling 
information, were smaller for subjects who viewed emotional pictures than for those who 
viewed neutral pictures. Furthermore, P3 amplitudes were smallest when participants 
viewed negative emotional pictures. Thus, these findings are also consistent with a theory 
of motivated attention suggesting that emotional information, especially negatively valent 
emotional information, may be especially salient, and individuals may both favor 
attending to such information and may have difficulty shifting attention away from it. 
In its general form, a theory of motivated attention has been supported by a robust 
collection of experimental paradigms. Robinson, et al. (2004) have refined this general 
theory, and suggest a two-stage model of the interaction of emotion and attention. 
Emotional arousal, these authors suggest, may be processed quickly, and at a preattentive 
level. Emotional valence, while processed quickly, may be processed (i.e., evaluated, 
discriminated, and responded to) later than arousal. Furthermore, Robinson et al. (2004) 
have shown that arousal and valence interact, such that low arousal negative stimuli may 
be processed slowly (nearly 1100ms) and high arousal positive stimuli may likewise be 
processed slowly (1120 ms), whereas high arousal negative stimuli may be processed in 
the least amount of time (nearly 1030ms) and low arousal positive stimuli may be 
processed moderately quickly (over 1040ms). Thus, it seems that participants are best 
able, or are perhaps most prepared or “motivated”, to process arousing negative stimuli, 
while they are least able, or least prepared or motivated, to process arousing positive 
stimuli. Convergent evidence for this hypothesis is provided by Atchley, R., et al. (in 
press). Atchley, R., et al. (in press) used a similar paradigm to Atchley, R., Ilardi, and 
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Enloe (2003, above), recruiting depressed, formerly depressed, and non-depressed 
individuals, and employing a divided visual field paradigm requiring subjects to make 
evaluations of emotional words. However, Atchley, R., Ilardi and Enloe (2003) 
manipulated both arousal and valence dimensions of emotion. In a pattern of results 
consistent with Robinson et al. (2004), findings indicated that all subjects demonstrated 
an advantage of evaluating highly arousing negatively valent words, and low arousing 
positively valent words.  
These studies suggest that the greatest impact on an attentional system may then 
come from highly arousing negative stimuli, followed by positive stimuli with low 
arousal, negative stimuli with low arousal, and finally positive stimuli with high arousal. 
These findings will be discussed in greater detail in the hypotheses section, below. 
With specific regard to the effect of emotional word processing on UFOV (and thus 
driving) performance, our lab has collected data from three pilot experiments, 
demonstrating the magnitude of emotional word processing (especially negatively valent 
emotional words). The following three experiments demonstrate the strength of the 
distracting effect of emotional word processing relative to alternative language 
processing, such as mere semantic association, and directional translation. 
Pilot Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 
 Twenty undergraduate students at the University of Kansas participated for course 
credit. All participants reported English to be their primary language and had normal or 
corrected to normal visual acuity.  
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Materials  
 Images were presented on a 17-inch EloTouch monitor, which allowed for touch-
screen response inputs. Three visual tasks from the functional field of view software 
developed by Visual Awareness, Inc., IL, were used. The details of these tasks will be 
discussed in more detail in the procedures section. Conversational stimuli consisted of 
moderate frequency words, chosen from the University of South Florida Word 
Association Norms (Nelson, et al., 1998). Correct responses were coded as those 
comprising the 5 most frequent responses listed by these norms. Conversational stimuli 
were recorded using Sound Studio 2.2 software (Felt Tip Software) for later analysis.  
Procedure 
Visual tasks. 
 The functional field of view software presents three tasks. The first visual task 
consisted of a sequence of stimuli in which a center fixation point was presented, 
followed by a car or truck icon inside a white box. Presentation times varied from 16ms – 
500ms, determined by an adaptive staircase procedure (described below). The 
presentation of the icon was followed by a 1 second random-dot mask. The mask was 
followed by a response screen that displayed both the car and truck icon (always in the 
same positions, to the right and left of fixation). Participants were required to make a 
discrimination judgment between the two possible targets. They were allowed as much 
time as needed to respond. Responses were made by touching the icon of their choice on 
the response screen. 
 The second visual task consisted of the same central discrimination task as task 
one, with the addition of an item (a car) simultaneously presented in the perimeter at one 
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of eight locations (top, bottom, left, right, or diagonal positions) 12 deg from center 
simultaneously with the centrally located car or truck icon. Participants responded first 
with a discrimination judgment to which item they had seen presented in the center, then 
with a localization judgment for where they had seen an item presented in the perimeter. 
The response screen for this judgment consisted of boxes at the eight possible target 
locations connected to the central location by radii. Participants were required to indicate 
only the location of the second target. The identity of this second target was unimportant 
to their response selection. 
 The third visual task duplicated the second, with the addition of triangle-shaped 
distractors arranged in the remainder of the visual field. The distractors were presented at 
all possible target locations in addition to the target, as well as at two locations along the 
radii from the center to the target location and possible target locations. The first ring of 
distractors was 4 deg from center. The second ring of distractors was 8 deg from center. 
Participants responded as in the second visual task with a discrimination judgment for the 
central task and a localization judgment for the secondary task. 
Conversational task. 
 Participants listened to words read by a single (common to each participant) male 
experimenter from the list mentioned above. Words were presented via a common 
telephone’s speakerphone function, placed less that two feet from the participant on the 
same desk as the monitor for the visual task. Participants were to listen to a given word 
and respond with the first “meaningfully related” word that came to mind. Subjects were 
informed that this could include antonyms (e.g., light : dark), or words related in context 
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(e.g., desk : chair). Participants were told to respond to both auditory and visual stimuli as 
quickly and accurately as possible. 
Results 
Conversational task performance 
 In all pilot experiments, participants performed at high levels of accuracy (90% or 
above). This leads us to believe that significant care was taken on the part of the 
participants to perform the secondary task with appropriate effort. That is, participants 
did not merely “say anything” in response to our verbal prompts. 
Visual task performance 
For all three experiments, effects of conversation are estimated by comparing to a 
common “no conversation” baseline. These baseline data were extracted from Atchley, 
P., and Dressel (2004), Experiment 2. For these baseline data, the average threshold for 
the first functional field of view task was 16ms, the average threshold for the second 
functional field of view task was 18ms, and the average threshold for the final functional 
field of view task was 51ms. These baseline data remained stable across five experiments 
in which the baseline data were measured, suggesting continued measurement of the 
baseline was not necessary. The three functional field of view tasks comprised a within-
subjects repeated measure, and the effect of conversational dual-task was analyzed as a 
between-subjects factor.  
Mixed-design ANOVA (with visual tasks as a repeated measure, conversational 
task presence as a between-subjects variable) revealed that the effect of conversation on 
visual task performance was significant, F(1, 48) = 26.3, p < .001. Overall, participants 
performed the three functional field of view tasks with an average baseline threshold of 
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28 milliseconds; when conversing, they performed the tasks with an average threshold of 
89 milliseconds. This was a moderate effect (η2 = .35). Clearly, even the demands of a 
rudimentary conversational task involving simple free association can affect visual 
attention.  
As was expected by the design of the functional field of view test, there was a 
significant main effect of visual task complexity as well, F(2, 96) = 55.9, p < .001. The 
effect size for this main effect was large (η2 = .54). Post-hoc paired comparison t-tests 
revealed that the simplest functional field of view task yielded the smallest thresholds (33 
ms), the more complex functional field of view task yielded significantly greater 
thresholds (81 ms, t(19) = 2.9, p < .05), and the most complex yielded still greater 
thresholds (154 ms, t(19) = 4.5, p < .05). 
The interaction of the effects of visual task complexity and conversational dual 
task was also significant, F(2, 96) = 16.1, p < .001. This moderate effect (η2 = .25) 
represents the increase in amount of time needed to correctly perform the central 
functional field of view task with the addition of a second target, and larger increase 
when distractors are added, when a conversational is also being processed. That is, the 
demands of the conversation seem to impede the processing of a second visual target, 
moreso a search for a second target among distractors, thus requiring longer presentation 
times to complete the tasks accurately.  
 To determine if the semantic task had less of an impact on the functional field of 
view than the task used in Atchley, P., and Dressel (2004), we compared mean thresholds 
in this experiment (33, 81 and 154 ms for the three functional field of view tasks, 
respectively) to mean thresholds in Experiment 2 of Atchley, P., and Dressel (56, 159, 
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and 202 ms for the three tasks) using t-tests. The means for all three subtests were 
significantly lower (t (48) = 1.7, 3.1, 1.7, p <.05 for the first, second, and third functional 
field of view tasks, respectively) in the current experiment, indicating the semantic 
conversational task was significantly less demanding than the task in which participants 
produced a word beginning with the last letter of the word they heard. This supports the 
central hypothesis that conversational demand modulates attentional reductions, and 
suggests accident risk may be a function of conversation type. We will re-examine this 
question of increased risk in the general discussion. 
Pilot Experiment 2 
 In the following set of experiments we examine the role of emotional 
conversations on visual attention. Anecdotally, anyone that has ever driven while in an 
angered mood state can attest that it is a more difficult task than when in a calm mood 
state. The question, then, is whether emotional conversations reduce performance by 
reducing attention. One possibility is that they do, but only through a mechanism of 
arousal. If that is true, we would expect both positive and negative emotional 
conversations to produce the same effect on attention. However, if being a negative mood 
state is particularly problematic, consistent with previous research and anecdotal 
evidence, then negative conversational tasks should lead to the greatest reduction in 
attention. To examine these hypotheses, we presented positively and negatively valent 
emotional words that were equivalently arousing, and measured the effect on the 
functional field of view performance of the participants. 
Method 
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Participants 
 Twenty undergraduate students at the University of Kansas participated for course 
credit. All participants reported English to be their primary language and had normal or 
corrected to normal visual acuity.  
Materials  
 All materials were the same as those used in Pilot Experiment 1 with the 
exception of the wordlist. In this third experiment, the wordlist consisted of words that 
had been rated by Bradley and Lang (1999) as having the top 25% emotional valence 
rating (positive) (e.g., jewel, infant). The words were equivalent in arousal rating, 
frequency, and length with the words in Pilot Experiment 3. 
Procedure 
Visual tasks. 
  The procedures for the three visual tasks were the same as those in Experiment 1. 
Conversational task. 
 All procedures and dependent measures from the conversational task were 
identical to those in Pilot Experiment 1. However, in Pilot Experiment 2, participants 
were asked to reply to these now “emotional” words by stating a word that began with the 
last letter of the given word, as was the task employed in Atchley, P., and Dressel (2004), 
experiments 1 and 2. It was not a requirement of the pilot experiment that the response 
word be “emotional”. 
Results 
The effect of conversation on visual task performance was once more significant, 
F(1, 48) = 45.6, p < .001. Overall, participants performed the three functional field of 
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view tasks with an average baseline threshold of 28 milliseconds; when conversing, they 
performed the tasks with an average threshold of 167 milliseconds. This was a moderate 
to large effect (η2 = .49).  
Once more, consistent with the design of the functional field of view test, there 
was a significant main effect of visual task complexity as well, F (2, 96) = 40.3, p < .001. 
The effect size for this main effect was similar to that reported in Pilot Experiment 1 (η2 
= .46). Post-hoc paired comparison t-tests revealed that the simplest functional field of 
view task yielded the smallest thresholds (94 ms), the more complex functional field of 
view task yielded significantly greater thresholds (188 ms, t(19) = 3.8, p < .05), and the 
most complex yielded still greater thresholds (219 ms, t(19) = 1.9, p < .05). 
As in Experiment 1, the interaction of the effects of visual task complexity and 
conversational dual task was also significant, F(2, 96) = 17.2, p < .001. As mentioned 
above, this moderate effect (η2 = .26) is interpreted as the larger increase in amount of 
time needed to correctly perform the increasingly complex functional field of view tasks 
when a conversational dual-task is also being processed.  
Pilot Experiment 3 
Method 
Participants 
 Twenty undergraduate students at the University of Kansas participated for course 
credit. All participants reported English to be their primary language and had normal or 
corrected to normal visual acuity.  
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Materials  
 All materials were the same as those used in Experiment 1 with the exception of 
the wordlist. In this third experiment, the wordlist consisted of words that had been rated 
by Bradley and Lang (1999) as having the bottom 25% emotional valence rating 
(negative) emotional valence rating (e.g., malaria, terrorist). The words were equivalent 
in arousal rating, frequency, and length with the words used in Pilot Experiment 2. 
Procedure 
Visual and Conversational tasks 
  The procedures for the three visual tasks and conversation task were the same as 
those in Pilot Experiment 2. 
Results 
The effect of conversation on visual task performance was significant, F(1, 48) = 
96.6, p <.001. Overall, participants performed the three functional field of view tasks 
with an average baseline threshold of 28 milliseconds; when conversing, they performed 
the tasks with an average threshold of 207 milliseconds. This was a large effect (η2 = 
.67). This large effect of negative-emotion evoking conversation is consistent with early 
work on the effect of emotion on visual attention (see Easterbrook, 1959).  
Again, consistent with the design of the functional field of view test, there was a 
significant main effect of visual task complexity as well, F(2, 96) = 66.1, p <.001. The 
effect size for this main effect was similar to those reported in Pilot Experiments 1 and 2, 
and 3a (η2 = .58). Post-hoc paired comparison t-tests revealed that the simplest functional 
field of view task yielded the smallest thresholds (97 ms), the more complex functional 
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field of view task yielded significantly greater thresholds (230 ms, t(19) = 5.2, p <.05), 
and the most complex yielded still greater thresholds (295 ms, t(19) = 3.1, p < .05). 
As in Pilot Experiments 1 and 2, the interaction of the effects of visual task 
complexity and conversational dual task was also significant, F(2, 96) = 35.9, p < .001. 
As mentioned above, this moderate effect (η2 = .43) is interpreted as the larger increase 
in amount of time needed to correctly perform the increasingly complex functional field 
of view tasks when a conversational dual-task is also being processed.  
Emotional Valence Analysis 
A difference in effect size was observed between the effect of positive emotional 
conversation (η2 = .49) and negative emotional conversation (η2 = .67) on functional field 
of view thresholds. This difference can be interpreted as an ability to predict 18% more of 
the variability in visual attention performance when the conversation is negatively 
emotional than when it is positively emotional. Consistent with prior research 
(Easterbrook, 1959), thresholds in the third, most complex, functional field of view task 
were higher for the negative emotional word case (mean presentation time = 295 ms) than 
the positive word condition (mean presentation time = 219 ms, t(38) = 1.7, p <.05).  
Summary and conclusions of pilot studies 
To summarize these findings, the risk data are consistent with the analyses of the 
individual experiments and they succinctly show how the different conversational tasks 
impact attention. A good proportion of participants (75%) were able to perform the 
simplest task with deficit to attention. The emotional conversations yielded UFOV scores 
predicting the highest risk group (10% of participants), and the negative emotional 
conversations seemed most problematic because they left fewer participants spared of 
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any risk (10%) and resulted in more people in the two highest risk categories (40%). That 
any participants would still be in a non-risk category with this conversational task is 
interesting and will be the subject of future research. 
To conclude, these pilot experiments demonstrate, with specific regard to the 
UFOV measure, not only that verbal tasks may affect visual attention mechanisms, but 
that emotional verbal tasks may be especially detrimental to visual task performance. 
UFOV scores were observed to be most affected by negatively valent emotional verbal 
tasks. This offers compelling evidence that emotional verbal processing may be 
particularly distracting to drivers, and is an important area of further study. 
However, dual task studies may require special consideration. There are at least 
four design elements that are important to consider when designing an experiment to 
achieve optimal, informative investigation of dual tasks costs. These design elements are 
discussed in the following section. 
 
Dual Task Methodology 
The nature of the ability for an individual to process emotional verbal stimuli 
while processing visual information, or any attentional bottleneck which may impede 
performance on two such tasks, is best investigated by the performance operating 
characteristic, or POC paradigm. An alternative to traditional dual-task methods, in which 
one task alone is fully prioritized, was described by Norman and Bobrow (1975), who 
described a method of measuring dual-task performance that takes task prioritization into 
consideration. This methodology describes the mathematical function of performance 
under various conditions of tradeoff between task prioritization.  
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A POC for a given pair of tasks and for a particular subject may be the function of 
all combinations of task performance measures (PT1, PT2) that arise from splitting total 
resources between two tasks into all possible task prioritization ratios. That is, some 
metric of performance for Task 1 is plotted along the X-axis, and some metric of 
performance for Task 2 is plotted along the Y-axis. When subjects are instructed to 
prioritize one task at various weights relative to the other task, a function relating the task 
tradeoff can be plotted.  
If perfect tradeoff between tasks occurs (i.e., a one unit decrease in performance 
on Task 1 performance leading to a one unit increase in Task 2), the plot of this function 
is a straight line with slope of -1. Such a function may be an indication of a shared 
resource pool, or central capacity. The graph of such a tradeoff appears as in the plot in 
Figure 1, (see below),  
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Figure 1. Hypothetical POC curve depicting tradeoff between task performance, or a 
“resource-limited process”. 
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which demonstrates a scenario in which performance improvement on one task cannot 
occur without an equal performance decrease on another task. This is what Norman & 
Bobrow (1975) refer to as a “resource-limited process”.  
Alternatively, it is possible that performance on Task 1 can improve without a 
decrease in performance on Task 2. In the extreme example, performance on a given task 
could remain perfect while performance on the other task could be adjusted freely in 
response to experimenter requests of prioritization. If performance levels of both tasks 
were capable of being adjusted with no related tradeoff, the plot of such a function 
appears as Figure 2, (see below).  
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Figure 2. Hypothetical POC curve depicting perfect resource sharing between task 
performance. 
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Thus, two such tasks would be thought to share no processing resources or capacity 
limits, suggesting the presence of multiple attentional resource pools (e.g., Wickens, 
2002). 
A function that approaches a straight line would be more congruent with central 
capacity theories of performance (e.g., Kahneman, 1973); a function that approaches the 
outer bounds of the plot would be more congruent with multiple-resource pool theories of 
performance (e.g., Wickens, 2002). In addition to testing the nature of the resource pools 
available for performing two concurrent tasks, the POC curve paradigm is more 
informative, containing data for prioritization levels other than 100% for one or the other 
task (i.e., data are collected for 50%-50% sharing of prioritization of the two tasks, for 
10%-90% sharing of prioritization, etc.). Thus, the most complete description of 
concurrent attentional performance can be accomplished via a POC methodology. 
The Performance Operating Characteristic (POC) methodology is couched in a 
theory of general cognitive resources. Support for such a notion is offered by Navon 
(1984), who suggests that a general resource theory is sufficient to create complex 
predictions of performance patterns given different concurrent task loads. For example, 
Lavie (2005) has made an appeal to a general resource pool theory, terming the task 
demands “cognitive load”. Lavie has shown that whereas increasing perceptual load 
(e.g., decreasing signal-to-noise ratio) may decrease the likelihood that distractors are 
processed, thus interfering with the processing of a target, increasing cognitive load (e.g., 
introducing a concurrent memory task) appears to increase the likelihood that distractors 
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are processed, increasing interference. Lavie suggests that this may be the overloading of 
a cognitive control mechanism, or central executive.  
Furthermore, Lavie, et al. (2004) have found that two selective attention 
mechanisms exist: (1) a perceptual selection mechanism which may be employed to 
reduce distraction from noise-laden displays, exhausting perceptual resources such that 
distractors are not processed to a level that allows for interference, and (2) a cognitive 
control mechanism (which we claim can be affected by emotion, as motivated attention 
theory suggests) that reduces interference from distractors as long as sufficient cognitive 
resources are available. Lavie et al. (2004) found that under conditions involving high 
cognitive demand (i.e., including a secondary working memory probe task in addition to 
a primary selective attention task), a larger interference effect of visual distractors in the 
selective attention task was observed.  
Similar findings have been found using cross-modal designs. Tellinghuisen and 
Nowak (2003), using a modification of a within-modality paradigm used by Lavie and 
Cox (1997) that increasing complexity of a concurrent auditory task increases the 
distraction effect of high visual load in a visual search task. Tellinghuisen and Nowak 
(2003) extended the cognitive load theory to involve cross-modal distractors. That is, 
distractors to visual targets could be compatible, neutral, or incompatible, as in the 
paradigm used by Lavie and Cox (1997), but instead were presented in the auditory 
modality. Tellinghuisen and Nowak found interference for auditory distractors in both 
high and low visual perceptual load conditions, and greater distraction (in contradiction 
to Lavie’s finding of less distraction) in high perceptual load conditions. 
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These resource allocation theories suggest that the additional processing demands 
of concurrent verbal tasks may impede processing of a visual attention task (i.e., cellular 
phone conversation may impede attending to relevant events in the driving environment). 
Processing language may be a demanding enough cognitive task that it interferes with the 
processing of visual information, with insufficient general resources to perform both 
tasks at high levels.  
In addition to POC methodology, subjective reports are an important research 
method to employ when investigating dual-task performance. Gopher and Donchin 
(1986) suggest that measurement of dual-task performance can benefit from the addition 
of first-person subjective data. That is, the individual performing given tasks is capable of 
producing data regarding how the tasks “felt”, in addition to her or his performance data. 
If performance data suggests that two tasks were easily performed (i.e., low errors and 
short response times), yet the participant reports that the combination of tasks was more 
difficult than a combination for which the participant produced more erroneous data, 
something must account for this discrepancy. Research demonstrates that subjective 
reporting of cognitive load can be a reliable measure of task performance, yielding 
consistent results (Gopher & Braune, 1984; Tsang & Velaquez, 1996; Paas, et al., 2003). 
Drivers are largely unaware of the risks associated with cellular phone use while driving 
(White, Eiser, & Harris, 2004). Thus, use of subjective reports may be especially 
appropriate for the measurement of dual-task costs to driving performance so that not 
only driving performance decrements, but also drivers’ awareness of these decrements 
may be investigated. 
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 Although the benefits of employing POC and subjective report methodologies in 
dual task studies are clear, they are not often included in an experimental design, 
especially in the applied field. The following section samples studies from the driver 
distraction literature, and discusses the limitations of existing experimental designs. 
   
Review of the Cellular Phone Related Driving Accident Risk Literature 
To date, research investigating dual-task interference as it relates to cellular phone 
use while driving can be described as belonging to one of three categories. 
“Correlational” (or regression) studies have attempted to demonstrate the relationship 
between the frequency or co-occurrence of cellular phone use with traffic accident 
frequency. Simulator studies (or studies simulating a roadway on a closed track) have 
attempted to demonstrate a decrement in driving performance (e.g., increase in collisions) 
while conversing on a cellular phone relative to driving performance in silence. Third, 
some studies have attempted to demonstrate a similar decrement in performance of tests 
of processes thought to be important to driving (e.g., visual attention tasks) while 
conversing on a cellular phone relative to performance in silence. Evidence from these 
three categories of research provide converging evidence that cellular phone use while 
driving increases accident risk, however, each category suffers distinct limitations due to 
experimental design issues.  
 
Correlational studies 
 Correlational studies of the effect of cellular phone conversation on driving 
accident risk have, at times, yielded mixed results. For example, using a survey method, 
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Violanti and Marshall (1996) obtained data from 100 drivers in New York who had been 
involved in accidents causing $1000 or more in damage within two years preceding their 
study. Also, they obtained the same data from a random sample of 100 drivers in New 
York who had not been in any accidents within ten years preceding their study. Their 
results showed that drivers who spoke on a cellular phone more than 50 minutes each 
month were 5.59 times as likely to have been in an accident. However, a limitation of this 
finding is that only 14 participants (7 percent of the sample) reported cell phone use. 
 Supporting this finding, Redelmeier and Tibshirani (1997) used a case-crossover 
design, obtaining accident reports and cellular phone billing records from 699 drivers 
who had recently had an auto accident. By comparing the billing record statement report 
of on-air phone usage with the time of collision reported in the accident report, they 
found that drivers had 4.3 times as many accidents during times when they were 
conversing on a cellular phone relative to times they were not using a cellular phone. 
Furthermore, accident risk was not significantly different for drivers using “hands free” 
phone devices and those using handheld devices (relative risks 5.9 and 3.9, respectively, 
actually greater for hands-free). 
Contrarily, Sullman and Baas (2004) used hierarchical logistic regression to 
analyze a survey of 861 New Zealand drivers. They found that after six demographic 
variables: age, gender, mileage driven, make and model of the automobile, “centre size”, 
and engine size were partialled out of a predictive equation, self-reported cellular phone 
use (as measured by a Likert-type scale of frequency) was no longer predictive of self-
reported accident involvement. However, this finding has the limitation of the possibility 
that after using six covariates, there may not have been sufficient statistical power to 
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detect a meaningful effect of cellular phone conversation. Additionally, a limitation of 
this technique is that self-report studies may be susceptible to inaccurate or false 
reporting. A further limitation of this approach is that participants filling out surveys are 
aware they are being studied, they may (whether they are aware of it or not) alter their 
responses to align with their own beliefs regarding cellular phone use. 
Another study suggesting cellular phone use has little to no impact on accident 
risk was provided by Stutts, Reinfurt, Staplin, & Rodgman (2001). This epidemiological 
study analyzes data from the Crashworthiness Data System (CDS) from 1995-1999. The 
CDS samples 5,000 police reported accidents yearly in which at least one car has been 
towed from the accident scene. Data are collected by “trained, professional crash 
investigation teams” (Stutts, et. al, 2001, p 3). These data suggest that 8.3 percent of 
accidents were attributable to driver distraction. This is in contrast to the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s (NHTSA) estimate that 20 to 30 percent of 
accidents are attributable to driver distraction, during a comparable timeframe (Wang, 
Knipling, & Goodman, 1996). Specifically, the authors report that of those 8.3 percent of 
drivers who were distracted, 1.5 percent were distracted by using or dialing a cellular 
phone. Initially, this suggests the impact of cellular phone use is a miniscule effect.  
However, there are problems with such an interpretation. Stutts, et. al, (2001) also 
report that 5.4 percent of accidents were of the category “looked, but didn’t see” (p. 9), a 
category that seems to describe a cognitive distraction (i.e., driver distraction, in this 
study seems to describe overt attention, while “looked but didn’t see” may include covert 
attention). It is possible that some drivers in the “looked but didn’t see” driver attention 
status category were also conversing on a cellular phone, but this cross-tabulation is not 
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reported. Thus, to the extent that “looked but didn’t see” drivers were also “distracted”, 
perhaps more than 1.5 percent of drivers were distracted by a cellular phone. 
Another intriguing finding reported by Stutts, et al. (2001) is that the second-most 
frequently observed driver attention status was the “unknown / no driver” category, 
which accounted for 35.9 percent of the accidents (“attentive” was the most frequent 
driver attention status, accounting for 48.6 percent of accidents). Disregarding for the 
moment the accidents involving no driver (oddly), the “unknown” frequency counts in 
this driver attention status essentially deflate the percentage of “known” attention status 
accidents for each of the other categories. That is, greater than 8.3 percent of drivers 
whose attention status was known, or who were present at the time of the accident were 
distracted. Perhaps Stutts, et al. (2001) say it best when they state that “it is recognized 
that the CDS underestimates the role of driver inattention and distraction in crashes (p. 
35). 
There are inherent limitations to a correlational, epidemiological approach to the 
issue of driver distraction. Perhaps most importantly, correlational (or regression) studies, 
each of these authors note, do not imply causation. Thus, it is possible for a third variable 
to be the causal factor contributing to higher accident rates among those who drive while 
conversing on a cellular phone. For example, frequency of risk-taking behavior could 
feasibly contribute to individuals engaging in both cellular phone conversations and 
hazardous maneuvers while driving. If such were the case, it would not be helpful for 
legislative bodies to ban cellular phone use while driving. In this example, risk-taking 
drivers would still take risks and get into accidents, merely without talking on a cellular 
phone at the same time. So, while correlational or co-occurrence studies relating real-
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world driving accidents to cellular phone use are intriguing and suggest a causal 
relationship, scientific experimental studies are necessary to empirically demonstrate 
such a causal relationship with a random sample of potential drivers. 
 
Simulation studies 
 Simulation studies of the impact of cellular phone use have resulted in more 
consistent results than their correlational counterparts. All simulation studies described 
below describe decrements in driving performance as a result of a conversational dual-
task. For example, an early study by Brown, Tickner, and Simmonds (1969) used a “real” 
automobile on a closed course. Drivers were to complete a circuit on a course, 
occasionally making judgments as to whether or not a gap between temporary obstacles 
was wide enough for the car to drive through. Gaps ranged from 3 inches smaller than the 
width of the vehicle, to 3 inches wider than the vehicle, thus difficulty of the driving task 
was adjusted. In the event of a narrow gap, the participant was to drive around the 
obstacles. Performance on the driving task with no concurrent conversation was 
compared to driving performance while drivers responded verbally to a series of spoken 
questions similar to those used by Baddeley (1968). In this task, participants were to 
listen to an assertion regarding two letters of the alphabet followed by those two letters of 
the alphabet, and were then to respond as to whether the assertion was true or false (e.g., 
A follows B – BA – True). Drivers made significantly more errors in gap judgment (45 
percent errors) and took longer to make those judgments when conversing, compared to 
when driving alone. Also, drivers slowed their rate of driving when conversing, and 
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speakers slowed their rate of replying while driving (and permitted more errors than in 
baseline) to compensate for task demands. 
Horswill and McKenna (1999) used video driving simulators to assess risk-taking 
judgments made by 121 university students with license to drive. In this study, 
participants were asked to prioritize a verbal task, which consisted of responding to each 
example in an auditory letter string. Letters were played via audiotape, at a pace of one 
letter per second, and participants were to reply “yes” if the letter was ‘K’, and “no” if it 
were any other. Results showed decrements in driving related risk perceptions such as 
accepting a size of gap in cross-traffic in which to pull out, reacting to hazards, and 
following distance, to the magnitude of an average z-score of .4, or nearly half a standard 
deviation. 
Furthermore, decrements in driving performance measures while participants 
were engaged in a concurrent conversational task while driving a simulated vehicle 
relative to their performance in silence were demonstrated by Horberry, Anderson, 
Regan, Triggs, and Brown (2006). In the conversation condition, participants were to 
respond to general knowledge questions by choosing an answer from two verbally 
presented alternatives. While engaged in conversation, participants displayed greater 
amounts of risky driving relative to when they were not engaged in conversation. These 
risky driving behaviors included greater deviation from posted speed limits, and less 
reduction in speed in response to hazards such as a pedestrian standing in the roadway, a 
car backing into the roadway from a driveway, and a pedestrian crossing the road. 
Furthermore, subjective reports of perceived workload were congruent with behavioral 
data: participants described sensing greater mental workload in dual-task conditions than 
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in single-task conditions. Also, participants correctly described still greater mental 
workload (i.e., correctly related to reduced performance) during another secondary task 
which yielded the greatest magnitude of dual-task costs, a manual task involving 
manipulating an in-vehicle information and entertainment system.  
Jamson, Westerman, Hockey, and Carsten (2004) demonstrated that such 
interference effects are not limited to cellular phones, but to increasingly common in-
vehicle computers. In this study, a computerized voice (based on Microsoft’s .NET 
Speech Software Development Kit Version 1.0) “read aloud” statements based on 
Baddeley’s (1968) grammatical reasoning task (similar to the task discussed above used 
by Brown, et al. (1969)). These statements occurred in one of two schedules: at the 
participant’s request (i.e., at a time when the roadway required low attentional demand) 
or at a predetermined pace, cued by a tone. Participants were to prioritize the driving task. 
With this design, rather than a block design, this study involved silence and conversation 
within one experimental session. Results demonstrated a decrement in performance when 
pacing of the e-mail delivery was not participant controlled relative to when delivery was 
participant controlled. Participants made more errors in judging the statements made in 
the e-mails, and were slower to reply when e-mails were delivered at a predetermined 
pace. Intriguingly, the section of the intermittent cellular phone experimental block 
during which a message was not being played (nor manipulated in any way) also yielded 
decrease performance in driving tasks. That is, merely anticipating a message (or to 
generalize, a cellular phone call) may interfere with driving. 
Furthermore, Jamson, et al. (2004) showed decrements in driving related 
measures as well. For example, participants were approximately 800 milliseconds slower 
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to “anticipate” a lead car braking in response to visible traffic cues such as a red traffic 
light (i.e., participants responded to the environment and/or the lead car braking by 
applying the brakes in the simulator vehicle) when a predetermined e-mail was read than 
when no e-mail was being read, and approximately 400 milliseconds slower to anticipate 
a lead car braking when a participant-determined e-mail was read. It should be noted that 
simulated traffic and road conditions may not have been the same in these two 
conditions; nevertheless, significant and meaningful dual-task costs were observed.  
 Converging evidence for increased reaction times to other vehicles braking is 
provided by Strayer, Drews, and Johnston (2003). This study required participants to 
drive through a realistic and multifaceted simulation course either in silence or while 
engaging in casual conversation. Conversations consisted of discussions of topics that 
had been reported to be of interest by each individual participant. The conversational 
dual-tasks were found to increase reaction time to a lead car braking, an effect that 
interacted with increased traffic density (in another lane of traffic) to create still greater 
reaction times.  
In another experiment, Strayer et al. (2003) found that recognition memory for 
billboards that had appeared along the simulated driving route was greater when the 
billboards were encountered under single-task conditions than when they had been 
encountered under dual-task, conversation conditions. This improvement in memory was 
not better accounted for by gaze fixation differences. Using an eyetracker, Strayer, et al. 
(2003) found the conditional probability of recognizing a billboard given that it had been 
fixated (i.e., looked directly at) in silence was double that of billboards fixated while 
conversing.  
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 Later, Strayer and Drews (2004) used similar methodology to describe other 
deficits in driving performance that can be attributed to concurrent cellular phone use, 
and to compare these deficits between younger and older drivers. Using a similar task as 
Strayer et al. (2003), conversations consisted of casual, topical conversations of interest 
to the participants. No differences in the effect of cellular phone conversation on driving 
performance measures between younger and older drivers were found. However, 
statistically significant and large decrements in performance measures such as braking 
reaction time, speed, following distance, and recovery of speed following braking were 
found for all participants.  
 In a recent study, Strayer, Drews, and Crouch (2004) compared the deleterious 
effects of conversing on a cellular phone while driving to the effects of driving legally 
intoxicated. Using a driving simulator, and help from the Utah Highway Patrol, one 
group of subjects served as a baseline of driving performance, a second group of subjects 
performed a conversational task similar to those described above, and another group 
drank a vodka and orange juice mixture in calculated doses to reach a blood alcohol 
concentration level of .08. The data suggest that the driver conversing on a cellular phone 
drove in a more impaired manner than the legally intoxicated driver. While intoxicated 
drivers drove more aggressively than baseline drivers, the only significant difference 
between baseline and intoxicated drivers was the amount of maximum brake force 
applied when braking (intoxicated drivers used greater force). Conversing drivers, 
contrarily, were 70 milliseconds slower to respond to a lead car braking than were the 
baseline drivers (intoxicated drivers were actually faster to respond than baseline drivers, 
suggesting an increased anticipation of braking). Also, conversing drivers demonstrated 
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2.3 seconds greater standard deviation in their following distance than baseline drivers. It 
is compelling that drivers conversing on a cellular phone (for which there are currently no 
complete bans) drive more dangerously than drivers who are legally intoxicated (for 
which all states have some legislation to reduce). 
While Strayer and his colleagues demonstrate reliable, meaningful decrements in 
a number of driving performance measures, the effects of prioritization remain unknown, 
as well as the relative interference caused by different conversational demands. 
  However, the question of whether different conversational demands yield 
different dual-task costs has been investigated by others. Some researchers have included 
variations of the complexity of a conversational task. For example, McKnight and 
McKnight (1993) used a video recording of driving vignettes as a form of driving 
simulator. Participants were provided with accelerator and brake pedals and a steering 
wheel, and were instructed to respond to instances in the video that required adjustment 
of speed or direction to avoid an accident, that is an evasive action. A variety of dual-
tasks were implemented, including tuning a radio to match a signal radio, “casual 
conversation” regarding demographic data and pastimes, and “intense conversations” 
regarding mathematical problems and short-term memory tests of digits. While likely 
atypical and artificial, these conversational tasks serve well to measure interference 
effects resulting from conversations of different levels of complexity, or cognitive effort. 
Response time to these questions was purposely not measured, but the proportion of 
critical events requiring evasive action that were missed by participants was 7 to 10 
percent greater in all distraction conditions, with intense conversations yielding 
significantly more missed events than casual conversations. 
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 Further evidence of the effect of conversational complexity on the magnitude of 
dual-task costs to driving measures is described by Shinar, Tractinsky, and Compton 
(2005). Ten young drivers with less than 6 months driving experience, ten experienced 
drivers with 8 to 15 years driving experience, and ten older drivers with an average of 35 
years of driving experience participated in the study. All participants were to drive a 
simulated vehicle through a course in either a moderate speed (50 mph), fast speed (65 
mph), or lead car (varying between 55 an 65 mph) condition for five experimental 
sessions, in which effects of practice were to be measured. Participants drove under three 
conditions: (1) silence, (2) an arithmetic questioning conversation, and (3) an emotionally 
involving conversation. The arithmetic conversation consisted of sequences of digits and 
operations were spoken before a prompt for the solution. The emotional conversation 
consisted of participants being challenged about topics reported to be of interest to 
themselves (e.g., a fan of a sports team was told that said team wasn’t performing well, 
and made to rebut).  
A significant effect of conversational complexity was observed. Greater 
decrements in driving performance measures such as driving slower than the appropriate 
speed and driving with sporadic speed fluctuations demonstrated during the difficult, 
arithmetic conversations than during the less complex, emotional conversations. 
However, other driving performance measures such as steering deviations and reaction 
time to peripherally presented signals yielded no effects of conversational complexity. 
For this reason, Shinar, et al. (2005) suggest that conversations involving arithmetic, 
which they contend are commonly used in experimental paradigms, may overestimate 
conversational interference.  
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Contrarily, Lee, Caven, Haake, & Brown (2001) provided evidence that dual-task 
costs from conversations may not be affected by conversational complexity. Specifically, 
Lee, et al. demonstrated the distraction a driver might face when interacting with a 
speech-based e-mail, “reading” system. Participants were to operate both a simple and 
complex e-mail delivery system. The simple system required decisions between two 
options at each of three levels of operation menus; the complex system required decisions 
between four to seven options at the three levels of operation menus. After practicing 
driving the simulator, participants followed a lead car, which would remain 1.8 seconds 
ahead of the driver, programmed to travel approximately 40 to 45 miles/h. This lead car 
would brake at random intervals (with given deceleration), and the participant was to 
respond by braking as soon as possible. Subjects were implicitly told to prioritize the 
driving task. The e-mail navigation dual-task yielded significantly longer reaction times 
to the lead car braking, by an average of 300 milliseconds. Furthermore, this study 
demonstrated additive effects of road complexity and the use of the e-mail system, yet 
failed to demonstrate an effect of the complexity of the menu systems in the e-mail task. 
However, a self-report scale of perceived distraction showed participants felt more 
distracted when using the complex system than the simple system, indicating a 
dissociation between perceived performance and behavioral data. 
Evidence for the lack of an effect of conversational complexity on dual-task costs 
to driving measures is also provided by Rakauskas, Gugerty, and Ward (2004). In this 
study, 24 young adult licensed drivers drove through a simulated circuit track. This track 
included parked car distractors, and hazardous events, such as a parked car pulling out in 
front of the driver or an oncoming car swerving in front of the driver programmed to 
39 
occur at given distances from the driver. In addition to driving during a conversation-free 
baseline, participants drove while responding to questions that had been rated during pilot 
testing as easy or difficult. None of these questions were thought to be visual/spatial in 
nature. Easy questions included demographic questions as well as questions about 
participants’ real-life schedules. Difficult questions included philosophical and moral 
dilemmas. Additionally, participants rated their perceived mental effort during the 
experiment as a whole via a single-dimension Likert-type scale.  
Small but statistically significant differences in driving performance were 
observed. Participants drove more slowly (1 mph), and displayed greater variability in 
their speed (.2 mph) when engaged in conversation relative to when they drove in silence. 
However, there was no effect of conversational complexity (i.e., question difficulty) on 
any of seven driving performance measures. Intriguingly, subjects reported an increased 
mental workload when conversing while driving relative to driving alone, but did not 
report a difference in workload between levels conversational complexity, mirroring their 
own behavioral data.  
Of course, findings such as Lee, et al. (2001) and Rakauskas, et al. (2004) do not 
falsify the hypothesis that conversational complexity can affect the magnitude of dual-
task interference, they merely suggest that some perceived differences in conversational 
complexity may not be sufficient to produce differences in driving performance 
measures. Furthermore, Shinar et al.’s (2005) contention that arithmetic tasks should be 
avoided in experiments suggests further reason to consider conversational task demands. 
Thus, researchers should investigate carefully potential conversational tasks to determine 
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aspects of conversation that affect dual-task costs with specific driving performance 
measures.  
 To summarize, simulator studies demonstrate the robust nature of dual-task 
interference as a result of conversing while driving. These studies demonstrate this effect 
in a causal manner. That is, samples of individuals who are randomly placed into a 
condition of driving while conversing show reliable decrements in a host of driving 
performance measures relative to individuals randomly placed into a condition of driving 
in silence. This decrement in performance occurs under identical driving conditions, 
other extensive controls, and often within-subject. Applied science approaches might 
consider these findings of causality to be pragmatic and useful. However, basic science 
approaches take interest in a question that is left unanswered by simulator studies: the 
identification of specific cognitive mechanisms that can account for these observed 
performance decrements.  
 
Studies of cognitive mechanisms used in driving 
 While basic science approaches have produced a great number of studies 
investigating cross-modal attention effects, a manageable number of studies have framed 
cross-modal attention specifically within a driving context. For example, an effect of 
conversation on simple reaction time is investigated in a study conducted by Consiglio, 
Driscoll, Witte, and Berg (2003). In this study, simple response time to the illumination 
of a red lamp (appropriately sized and shaped to reflect the visual angle to be obtended by 
an automobile’s brake lamp 12 m in front of a driver) situated in front of the participant 
was measured under several distraction conditions. Participants responded by releasing a 
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mock accelerator and depressing a mock brake pedal in each of five conditions: (1) 
silence, (2) passive listening to music played on a radio, (3) conversing with a 
“passenger” seated to the right of the participant in a casual manner “as one might have 
with a new acquaintance” (p 496), (4) a similar conversation with the same individual via 
hands-held phone, and (5) a similar conversation with the same individual via hands-free 
phone. Orders of these conditions were presented in counterbalanced order. Results 
suggested no difference in response time between silence and passive listening 
conditions, but significant increase in response time relative to these conditions for each 
of the three conversation conditions, by an average of 60 milliseconds. No differences 
between conversation conditions were observed. The study makes no direct citation of 
the accident risk increase associated with a 60 ms increase in response time; however, the 
notion that simple detection of the onset of a fixed-location target can be impaired by 
casual conversation is compelling. 
 Another mechanism capable of accounting for conversation’s negative effect on 
driving performance is that of planning eye fixations. Recarte and Nunes (2000) 
discussed differences in scanning and fixating on items in the driving environment under 
conditions of various conversations and a silent baseline. In an on-road, “real-life” 
automobile, an eyetracker recorded gaze positions and fixation locations and durations. 
Participants were to drive a planned route while: (1) not conversing, (2) replying to a 
given letter with a list of words beginning with that letter for 30 seconds per letter, or (3) 
replying to a given letter by answering an imagery-related question regarding the letter’s 
shape. Imagery-related questions consisted of answering whether the given letter 
remained the same if “flipped” across a horizontal, or vertical, axis, and whether the letter 
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was “closed” (i.e., contained a “circular” area, as in the letter ‘b’ or the number ‘4’) or 
“open” (i.e., did not contain such an area, as in the letter ‘s’ or the number ‘7’).  
Eyetracking data showed that verbally creating word lists decreased fixation times 
relative to baseline, while verbal imagery tasks increased fixation times relative to 
baseline. Also, during baseline, participants exhibited large “visual inspection windows”, 
or regions in which gaze fixations were likely to occur. This inspection window was 
significantly smaller while verbally creating word lists, and smallest while performing 
verbal imagery tasks. Furthermore, participants fixated on mirrors and the speedometer 
less frequently when verbally creating word lists than during baseline, and least 
frequently when performing verbal imagery tasks (under most driving conditions). 
 In addition to cellular phone induced differences in fixation patterns, reduced 
efficacy of visual attention may increase accident risk. Supporting this notion, Amado 
and Ulupinar (2005) posited that decrements in performance on attentional measures 
could account for higher accident rates of drivers conversing on a cellular phone. Forty-
eight undergraduate students demonstrated decreased performance on two attentional 
tasks, the “Cognitrone” task and the “Peripheral Detection and Dual-processing Task 
(PDDpT)”, when conversing relative to performance in silence. The Cognitrone task 
consisted of a computer-based test that uses a variation of a match-to-sample task, 
combining error rates and reaction time to create a composite score. The PDDpT task 
consisted of a driving simulator in which drivers were instructed to avoid other cars on a 
straight path, and respond to illumination of an LED panel on each side of the simulator 
(at an unreported degree of eccentricity). Participants were to make a speeded response 
when either or both LED panels were illuminated, while at the same time driving the 
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simulated vehicle. In addition to a conversation-free baseline, the conversational dual-
task demands were administered at two levels of complexity. These conversational tasks 
consisted of general knowledge questions and arithmetic problems divided into two 
levels of difficulty. Questions were either read aloud next to participants or played on a 
CD player. Amado and Ulupinar found reliable decrements in both the Cognitrone and 
PDDpT attentional measures. No effect of question delivery mechanism (i.e., reading 
aloud vs. CD player) was found. However, there was an effect of question difficulty. 
Participants yielded poorer, slower performance on both attentional measures when 
complex questions were being asked relative to when simple questions were being asked. 
Also, conversing drivers were 2 to 4 times as likely to collide with a median (center line) 
as drivers who were not conversing. Thus, attentional mechanisms may suffer from 
reliably poorer performance when a driver is conversing. 
 Further evidence for the hypothesis that visual attentional mechanisms may suffer 
as a result of concurrent conversation was provided by Atchley, P., and Dressel (2004). In 
this study, participants’ Useful Field of View (UFOV), or functional field of view 
(Sanders, 1970), was measured in both dual-task and single-task conditions. The UFOV 
has been established as having a relationship with older drivers’ accident risk was shown 
to decline in dual-task conditions relative to single-task conditions (Goode, et al. 1998). 
Conversations consisted of, in two experiments, simple and memory load imposing single 
word responses to single given words. When engaged in conversation, participants 
yielded thresholds to detect targets many times greater relative to thresholds when no 
conversational dual-task was required. Thresholds of the magnitude exhibited by some 
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participants might predict them to be as much as 16.3 times more likely to be in an 
injurious accident as a result of concurrent conversation. 
 Evidence that another aspect of visual attention can be negatively affected by 
conversation is offered by McCarley, Vais, Pringle, Kramer, Irwin, and Strayer (2004). In 
two experiments, these researchers demonstrated that performance in a change detection 
task was reduced under the demands of conversation, but not under demands of attentive 
listening. Change detection involves noticing, in a flicker display paradigm (Rensink, 
O’Regan, & Clark, 1997), the change in an element of the scene (e.g., the vanishing and 
reappearance of an object). This measure is thought to tap endogenous attention, and is 
often a difficult task; the time it takes to notice the change in the scene (or the failure to 
notice it altogether) has been termed “change blindness” by Simons and Levin (1997). 
Participants, especially a group of older participants, made more errors in change 
detection when engaged in a topical conversation regarding television shows and hobbies, 
relative to a single-task condition. 
 In addition to effects related to eyetracking and specific attentional mechanisms, 
studies have demonstrated that performance on a continuous attentional task not unlike 
simulated driving may be negatively impacted by concurrent conversation, a pursuit 
tracking task. In a pursuit tracking task, participants must use some manual interface to 
control an on-screen target object such that it remains within specified (moving) 
boundaries. Briem and Hedman (1995) used a pursuit tracking task using an accelerator 
pedal and steering wheel. Conversations took two forms: simple and complex. During 
“simple” conversations, participants engaged in two minute conversations regarding 
topics such as the war in Bosnia and the unemployment situation in Sweden. During 
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complex conversations, participants were to first indicate whether each given sentence 
was logical or illogical (e.g., “The driver ate a car” is illogical), and then repeat to the 
experimenter the first words of the past four sentences, thus requiring decisions to be 
made while imposing a memory load. Briem and Hedman demonstrated that participants 
emitted both more speed violation errors and greater position deviation errors in a pursuit 
tracking task when conversing relative to when they were not. Interference was observed 
during both concurrent conversational tasks, however greater interference on many 
measures was observed during more complex conversations. 
 Strayer and Johnston (2001) used a similar pursuit tracking task to assess the 
dual-task cost of concurrent conversation. While participants conversed about topics such 
as the impeachment of President Clinton and other (then) current events, participants 
made greater tracking error on difficult “courses”. Control of the “car” cursor in this 
study was performed with a joystick. Additionally, participants were to click a joystick 
button in response to the target (i.e., to-be-tracked) object changing color to red. 
Participants were more likely to miss a “red light”, and were slower to respond, when 
conversing relative to a single-task condition. This pattern of data was not observed, it 
should be noted, when participants listened to a radio broadcast of their choosing.  
In conclusion, pursuit tracking studies indicate that drivers may likewise regulate 
speed less effectively and maneuver an automobile with less precision while conversing 
on a cellular phone. Such parallels in driving performance seem intuitively related to 
greater accident risk. Furthermore, drivers may scan the roadway less effectively and 
completely while conversing. Compounding this problem, drivers may process visual 
information within these diminished scanning patterns less effectively while conversing. 
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Thus, several cognitive mechanisms have been identified that can offer specific accounts 
for the impaired driving performance demonstrated explicitly by simulator studies, and 
suggested by correlational studies.  
 
Discussion of Driver Distraction Literature Review 
 In this sample of 17 (not counting correlational) studies investigating the effect of 
cellular phone conversations on driving accident risk, designs are less than optimal. Most 
notably, none of the studies discussed in this review utilized the powerful Performance 
Operating Characteristic paradigm discussed above. Thus, it remains unknown what 
function describes a driver’s ability to “trade-off” performance from the driving task to 
the conversation task. Many studies utilize a traditional dual-task method, assigning 
prioritization schedules for the participants to adhere to. Without explicitly measuring 
priority tradeoff, a researcher cannot be certain that prioritization is occurring in the 
intended manner. That is, while driving was (often) to be prioritized in these studies, the 
lack of potential harm, and lack of explicit instructions to “de-prioritize” conversational 
tasks may enable the participant to also prioritize conversation. Also, traditional dual-task 
methods leave the possibility decrements in driving (or driving related) performance only 
exist at the assigned levels of prioritization. That is, while the current evidence suggests 
that talking drivers are prone to miss hazards, for example, it could be that a real-world 
driver would prioritize the “life or death situation” of driving an automobile higher than 
the artificial prioritization of driving a “safe” simulator. By prioritizing real-world driving 
at a higher level (or conversation at a lower level), perhaps decrements in performance 
would not be seen. Correlational studies mentioned above suggest this prioritization 
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explanation is not the case; POC studies could scientifically demonstrate that this is not 
the case. 
 Second, eight studies (nearly half) fail to report performance data for both 
“driving” and conversational tasks. As mentioned above, such reporting is necessary to 
insure that the secondary task has its intended effect. It could be the case, in these studies, 
that participants merely “tuned out” the conversation, and provided incoherent or 
unrelated responses to their conversational prompts. While conversations that can be 
scored tend to deviate from typical conversational material and format (e.g., 
mathematical problem solving or recalling the first word of each sentence), some aspect 
of the conversation should be measured. Doing so means that experimenters can measure 
whether participants are paying thoughtful attention and planning appropriate responses 
to the conversational prompts. Efforts to do so while preserving ecological validity of the 
conversation task will be most fruitful. As discussed above, identifying such 
conversational tasks is an important area for future research. 
 Finally, only four studies utilized a self-report measure of subjective task 
demands. Interestingly, of these four studies, two reported congruent patterns of results 
for subjective ratings and behavioral data (Rakauskas, et al., 2004; and Horberry, et al., 
2006), and two reported incongruent patterns of results (Lee, et al., 2001; and Shinar, et 
al., 2005). That is, a limited number of studies demonstrate both that participants are 
aware of the difficulty of dual-tasks and the decrement in performance they impart, and 
that participants are unaware of the difficulty of dual-tasks and are unaware of any 
decrement in performance.  
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Clearly, more research is needed to address the issue of the utility of self-reports 
in dual task studies. Understanding the relationship between subjective and behavioral 
data is of urgent importance in this applied setting. In a study investigating drivers’ 
ratings of the danger involved in doing various tasks while driving, White, Eiser, and 
Harris (2004) found that making and receiving hands-free cell phone calls were rated as 
relatively harmless, falling between sneezing and smoking in rankings (Table I, p. 326). 
Thus, it seems that drivers may underestimate the interfering effects of concurrent 
cellular phone conversation while driving; any understanding as to how these errors are 
made may be used to help calibrate these judgments. 
 To summarize, studies investigating the impact of cellular phone conversations on 
driving performance can be grouped into three categories: correlational studies, simulator 
studies, and studies of specific cognitive mechanisms. Simulator studies provide the 
causal relationship that correlational studies lack at the possible expense of some 
ecological validity. Studies of specific cognitive mechanisms used in driving provide 
more specific explanations for driving performance decrement than simulator studies can 
provide, yet may sacrifice still more ecological validity. Together, these studies converge 
to report reliable, valid findings that cellular phone use while driving increases accident 
risk. Table 2 summarizes the effects of driver distraction reported by each study. 
 However, existing studies may leave gaps in our knowledge of this specific dual-
task due to methodological limitations. Future studies would benefit from (1) measuring 
performance on both tasks, to insure (or at least to measure) any task trade-offs, (2) using 
a Performance Operating Characteristic paradigm to systematically induce these trade-
offs, and to find the function defining how drivers may feasibly trade-off between tasks 
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of driving and conversing (3) using multiple levels of complexity of both tasks, to 
measure not just the raw outcome of difficulty manipulations, but also how the 
processing of the two tasks may change as a result of difficulty manipulations and (4) 
measuring subjective ratings of cognitive load or perceived task difficulty, particularly to 
identify any dissociation between actual and perceived performance. The prevalence of 
these four design elements in the literature reviewed above is displayed in Table 1. 
 Thus, careful consideration must be given to particular design elements when 
researching dual tasks. The four design elements discussed above have been employed in 
the current investigation into the distracting effect of emotional verbal tasks on visual 
attention performance.  
Dissertation Experiment 
Method 
Subjects 
One hundred sixteen participants were recruited from Introductory Psychology 
and Research Methodology classes at the University of Kansas. Thirty participants did 
not complete the full experiment due to misunderstanding directions, resulting in 
unusable data. Three participants were not included in analyses because of equipment 
failure (battery expiration in devices). Two participants were not included because they 
did not demonstrate 20/20 vision for both eyes in a prescreening acuity test. One 
participant did not complete the study, reporting that the given words were not audible. 
Data obtained from the remaining 80 participants are reported below. Mean age of these 
participants at the time of their participation was 20.5 years. 
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Materials  
 A computerized version of the UFOV visual attention test (Visual Awareness, 
Inc., Chicago, IL) was implemented via EloTouch touch-screen monitor. This test 
consists of three subtests: (1) central target discrimination, (2) central target 
discrimination and simultaneous peripheral target localization, and (3) task two, above, in 
the presence of a field of triangle distracters, (see Figure 3, below, for an example of the 
third UFOV task stimulus screen).  
 
Figure 3. Example of the third UFOV task stimulus screen. 
 
Dependent measures for the UFOV task are the presentation time threshold, determined 
via adaptive staircase design, for participants to detect or discriminate the single target (in 
subtest 1) or both targets (in subtests 2 and 3) correctly 75% of the time. Three UFOV 
scores are reported, one for each subtest, however, a composite of these three scores 
determine a categorical odds-ratio prediction for driving accident risk. 
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 Verbal tasks consisted of words read one at a time, alternating stimulus 
presentation (i.e., the experimenter reading the word) and response (i.e., the subject 
speaking his or her single word response) via E-prime software. Words were presented at 
a constant rate with interstimulus-interval (ISI) of four seconds, a rate that pilot data 
reveals to be a sufficient time to allow subjects to generate a response. Four word lists 
have been created, manipulating emotional valence and arousal ratings in a factorial 
design: (1) positive valence / high arousal, (2) positive valence / low arousal, and (3) 
negative valence / high arousal, and (4) negative valence / low arousal. All lists are 
controlled for word frequency (mean frequency = 38.7 appearances per 100,000 words, 
Kucera & Francis, 1967). Valence and arousal levels of the stimulus words were 
manipulated using the Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW) Database (Bradley 
& Lang, 1999), which includes ratings of 1034 words on a 9-point Likert-type scale. 
Valence has been manipulated such that words on the positive valence list have ratings 
greater than 6 on a 9-point scale, and words on the negative valence list have ratings less 
than 4. Arousal has been manipulated such that words on the high arousal list have 
ratings greater than 6 on a 9-point scale, and words on the low arousal list have ratings 
less than 6. Dependent measures for the verbal task include latency to respond, measured 
by a voice key and E-prime software, and the sum of error rates for errors of commission 
(i.e., words that are rated as being unrelated to the given word), and errors of omission 
(i.e., a failure to respond to the given word in the four second response allowance time).  
 A computerized version of the NASA Task Load Index (TLX) was administered 
immediately following each of the three experimental (dual-task) phase, that is, after each 
UFOV subtest. Hart and Staveland (1988) demonstrated the utility of the NASA TLX in 
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measuring six workload related factors to create a reliable and useful subjective rating of 
cognitive load. The TLX measures subjective workload in two stages. First, participants 
report the strength of each of six workload dimensions: mental demand, physical demand, 
temporal demand, performance, effort, and frustration on a 20 point Likert-type scale, 
ranging from “low” to “high”, (see Figure 4, below). 
 
Figure 4. Screenshot of the first stage of TLX subjective reporting. 
 
Next, participants respond to 15 two-alternative-forced-choice options, selecting which of 
two factors was a greater influence on workload, (see Figure 5, below). 
53 
 
Figure 5. Screenshot of the second stage of TLX subjective reporting. 
 
These stages combine to create an overall workload score and scores describing the 
impact of each of the six dimensions on this overall workload score. 
 
Experimental Design and Procedure 
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions, in a 3 
(prioritization schedule) x 4 (emotion condition) mixed factorial design: subjects were 
instructed to prioritize the visual attention task (i.e., they were told they could “skip” as 
many responses to the verbal task as they wished, including all of them, or they could 
make “unrelated” or repeated responses), as 50% of their dual-task performance goal 
(i.e., they were told to try to perform both tasks as well as they could), or to focus on the 
verbal task (i.e., they were told to only pay enough attention to the UFOV tests to 
advance through the response screens, and that they “didn’t have to try to be correct”), a 
within-subjects measure. Also, subjects heard words from one of the 4 emotion condition 
lists (high arousal negative valence, low arousal negative valence, high arousal positive 
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valence, and low arousal positive valence), a between-subjects measure. Thus, each cell 
in the factorial design included data from 20 subjects.  
Subjects were first screened for visual acuity; only data from subjects with normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision were collected for analysis. Subjects were then informed of 
the experimental procedures (above). Subjects were asked if they comprehend the 
prioritization schedule and experimental tasks. A minimum of four practice trials of each 
UFOV subtest were administered before the tests began; subjects were allowed to repeat 
blocks of four practice trials until they reported an understanding of the subtest. The 
concurrent UFOV tasks and verbal task were administered; verbal responses were 
recorded with a digital voice recorder into digital sound files for later analysis of error 
rate (see below). Subjects were asked to respond to the words they heard by stating the 
first meaningfully related word that comes to their mind, though not necessarily a true 
synonym (e.g., “chair” in response to the given word “desk”). Responses were be judged 
by two research assistants on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = not at all related in 
meaning, 7 = very closely related in meaning).  
Following each stage of the UFOV task during the experiment proper, the NASA 
TLX was administered, measuring subjects’ subjective reports for the dual-task 
workload. That is, rather than assess the visual and conversational tasks independently, 
the dual-task itself was assessed.  
 
Hypotheses 
Anticipated Dual Task Cost 
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While much of the current research is exploratory, there are reasons to predict a 
specific pattern of results. First, given the wealth of dual-task interference effects 
described in basic and applied science literatures, specifically prior research using similar 
methods to those proposed (e.g., Atchley, P., & Dressel, 2004), we hypothesize a main 
effect of dual-task demand. That is, we expect to observe greater UFOV thresholds in the 
visual task and both longer response latencies and a greater number of errors in the verbal 
task under dual-task conditions, overall, than in “single task” (i.e., focused attention) 
conditions. This hypothesis is additionally supported by theories, mentioned above, 
which view the UFOV task as not merely a low-level perceptual task, but as a higher 
level cognitive task (e.g., Sekuler, Bennett, and Mamelak, 2000). If the UFOV task 
involves executive cognitive control processes, then it may more readily be interfered 
with by a cognitively demanding task such as proto-conversation (e.g., Lavie et al., 2004; 
Tellinghuisen & Nowak, 2003). It is anticipated that both visual attention and verbal task 
performance will decline in the presence of dual-task demands relative to focused 
attention. 
 
Anticipated POC Curves 
Additionally, it is hypothesized that the shape of the POC curves (i.e., the ability 
for subjects to trade off prioritization) will be dependent on the emotional valence and 
arousal of the stimuli words. As discussed above, the interfering effects of negative 
emotional valent stimuli have been theoretically, neurophysiologically, and empirically 
(i.e., behaviorally) supported. Furthermore, specific directional hypotheses can be 
expected from the findings of Atchley, R., et al. (in press), and Robinson, et al. (2004). It 
56 
is expected that the average POC curve exhibited by subjects in the high arousal 
negatively valent emotion condition will show greatest linearity (i.e., more consistent 
with a resource limitation) than the average POC curve exhibited by subjects in the high 
arousal positively valent emotion condition (i.e., suggesting availability of excess 
resources), which is expected to show greatest curvature (i.e., worst fit to linearity). 
Between these two poles are expected to lie the POC curves for the low arousal positively 
valent condition (expected to yield the second best fit to linearity), and for the low 
arousal negatively valent condition (expected to yield the third best fit to linearity). 
Because of the relative salience of these stimuli, and how these emotional conditions map 
to a theory of motivated attention, this pattern of results is to be expected. 
 
Anticipated Relationship of Task Performance and Subjective Awareness 
Finally, subjective reports are hypothesized to be indicative of overall dual-task 
performance, though to a moderate extent (i.e., with substantial error). That is, positive, 
yet weak correlations are expected to be obtained between NASA TLX ratings of task 
difficulty and task performance. Specific relations between subjective reports and 
performance on single tasks are uncertain. That is, we do not have reason to firmly 
hypothesize the relative impacts of task prioritization, arousal and emotional valence on 
subjective ratings. However, anecdotal evidence from informally questioning pilot 
subjects suggests that subjects are aware of the increasing difficulty of the three UFOV 
tasks, which suggests that there may be a relationship between subjective reports and 
UFOV task performance. Contrarily, drivers report a lack of awareness of the risks of 
cellular phone conversations while driving (White, Eiser, & Harris, 2004). These 
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conflicting findings make a more systematic assessment of the relationship between 
subjective awareness of task demands and dual-task performance a necessary and 
important venture. 
Dissertation Experiment Results 
 Useful Field of View Data 
 As could be expected from the intended design of the UFOV test, there was an 
effect of UFOV subtest type (i.e., difficulty) on UFOV threshold scores. Repeated-
measures ANOVA revealed that this was a significant effect, F(2, 158) = 150.2, p < .01, 
η2 = .66. Furthermore, post-hoc t-tests revealed that the first UFOV subtest yielded the 
lowest thresholds (M = 74 ms), the second UFOV subtest yielded larger thresholds (M 
=106 ms), and the third UFOV subtest yielded the largest thresholds (M = 143 ms); each 
Bonferroni adjusted pairwise comparison showed these differences to be significant (p < 
.01). 
 Useful Field of View thresholds were also significantly affected by attentional 
prioritization, or how much effort was devoted to performing the UFOV task by the 
participants, F(2, 158) = 82.9, p < .01, η2 = .51. Bonferroni adjusted pairwise 
comparisons revealed that lowest mean UFOV thresholds (i.e., the average of the three 
subtest thresholds) were exhibited when participants focused attention on the UFOV task 
(M = 35 ms), larger thresholds were exhibited when participants devoted “equal” 
attention to the UFOV and verbal tasks (M = 64 ms), and the largest thresholds were 
exhibited, not surprisingly, when participants “ignored” the UFOV task (i.e., focused 
attention on verbal task performance) (M = 223 ms); each pairwise comparison was again 
significant (p < .05).  
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 Additionally, there was a significant interaction of the effects of attention 
allocation and UFOV subtest difficulty. When focusing on the UFOV task, participants 
exhibited mean UFOV thresholds of 17, 22, and 68 milliseconds for the first, second, and 
third UFOV subtests, respectively (all comparisons significant, p < .05). The effect of 
UFOV difficulty under the “focused” condition was significant, F(2, 158) = 92.4, p < .01, 
η2 = .54, (see Figure 6, below).  
 
 
Figure 6. Mean UFOV thresholds observed under the “Focus on the UFOV” 
prioritization condition. 
 
When attending to the UFOV and verbal task “equally”, participants exhibited 
mean UFOV thresholds of 35, 58, and 97 milliseconds for the first, second, and third 
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UFOV subtests, respectively (again, all comparisons significant, p <.05). The effect of 
UFOV difficulty under the “equal emphasis” condition was significant, F(2, 158) = 82.3, 
p < .01, η2 = .51, (see Figure 7, below).  
 
Figure 7. Mean UFOV thresholds observed under the “equal emphasis” prioritization 
condition. 
 
Finally, when “ignoring” the UFOV task, participants exhibited mean UFOV 
thresholds of 169, 236, and 264, for the first, second, and third UFOV subtests, 
respectively (again, all comparisons significant, p <.05). The effect of UFOV difficulty 
under the “ignore the UFOV” condition was significant, F(2, 158) = 53.1, p < .01, η2 = 
.40. Thus, while a significant effect of UFOV task difficulty was observed under each of 
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the three attentional prioritization conditions, this effect was smaller when the UFOV test 
was “ignored”, (see Figure 8, below).  
 
Figure 8. Mean UFOV thresholds observed under the “ignore the UFOV” prioritization 
condition. 
 
 No effects of the emotional qualities of the given words in the verbal task were 
observed on the UFOV thresholds. Neither emotional valence, F (1, 76) = 1.4, p = .24, 
nor emotional arousal level, F (1, 76) = .06, p = .8, demonstrated significant effects. No 
interaction effects with UFOV subtest or attentional allocation level (or both) were 
observed (all p >.05). However, within the first UFOV subtest, there was a significant, 
yet small, interaction between emotional valence and attentional focus, F (2,158) = 3.4, p 
< .05, η2 = .04. Post-hoc analyses revealed that, within the first UFOV subtest, 
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participants yielded UFOV thresholds of 16, 27, and 199 milliseconds under conditions 
of focusing on the UFOV, placing “equal” emphasis on both tasks, and “ignoring” the 
UFOV, respectively, when responding to negatively valent given words (of both high and 
low arousal levels). When responding to positively valent given words (of both high and 
low arousal levels) within the first UFOV subtest, participants yielded UFOV thresholds 
of 18, 43, and 140 milliseconds under conditions of focusing on the UFOV, placing 
“equal” emphasis on both tasks, and “ignoring” the UFOV, respectively. Pairwise 
comparisons revealed that longer thresholds were observed when ignoring negatively 
valent words (M = 199 ms) than when ignoring positively valent words (M = 140 ms, p < 
.05). Thus, it may be the case that it was more difficult for participants to “tune out” 
negatively valent verbal stimuli, resulting in larger UFOV thresholds during the first 
UFOV subtest. However, as the UFOV task became more complex, this effect 
diminished. Within the second UFOV task, this interaction was not significant, F (2,158) 
= 2.7, p = .07. Within the second UFOV task, this interaction was not significant, F 
(2,158) = 1.9, p = .15. That is, the increasing cognitive demands of a more complex 
concurrent UFOV task may have attenuated the effect of the emotional properties of the 
given verbal stimuli. 
   
 Verbal Task Data – Reaction Time 
 As described above, reaction time measures were measured from the offset of the 
given recorded word to the beginning of the participant’s utterance. From these reaction 
time measures, only reaction times for “related” responses were analyzed. That is, 
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reaction times for only those responses with a mean similarity rating of 3.5 or greater 
were included in these analyses. 
 Unlike the pattern of data observed for the UFOV task performance, there was no 
significant effect of concurrent UFOV task difficulty on verbal task reaction time, F (2, 
34) = 2.1, p > .05, η2 = .11. However, a significant main effect of attentional focus was 
observed, F (2, 34) = 3.9, p < .05, η2 = .19. Participants responded in the least amount of 
time when “ignoring” on the UFOV task (i.e., focused on the verbal task), M = 1120 
milliseconds, significantly less time than when devoting “equal” attention to both tasks, 
M = 1241 ms, p < .01, yet not significantly less time than when focused the UFOV task 
(i.e., “ignoring” the verbal task), M = 1221 ms, p > .05, (see Figures 9, 10, and 11, 
below).  
 
Figure 9. Reaction time of verbal responses under the “ignore the UFOV” prioritization 
condition. 
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Figure 10. Reaction time of verbal responses under the “equal emphasis” prioritization 
condition. 
 
 
Figure 11. Reaction time of verbal responses under the “focus on the UFOV” 
prioritization condition. 
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That is, while placing additional attention on the verbal task improved performance 
 no 
 
ional qualities of the given words in the verbal task 
5, 
 
 
e 
eard high 
 
Correlations of Verbal Task Reaction Time and UFOV Task Threshold 
 C e are 
listed in Table 2, below. Correlations between performance on the concurrent tasks were 
relative to placing equal attention on both tasks or ignoring the verbal task, there was
difference in performance between participants ignoring the verbal task and placing equal
emphasis on both tasks. In short, participants could improve performance by allocating 
more attention to the verbal task.  
 No main effect of the emot
were observed on verbal task response times. That is, there was no main effect of the 
valence or arousal levels of the words presented to participants. Neither emotional 
valence, F (1, 64) = .16, p = .69, nor emotional arousal level, F (1, 64) = .10, p = .7
demonstrated significant effects. However, there was a significant interaction between
prioritization level and the emotional category of the stimulus words. When participants
placed equal emphasis on both tasks, high arousal negatively valent words yielded the 
longest mean response time (M = 1478ms, all p < .05). When participants focused on th
UFOV task (i.e., “ignored” the verbal task), these same high arousal negatively valent 
words yielded the shortest mean response time (M = 970ms, all p < .05). 
 Thus, the greatest dual-task cost was observed when participants h
arousal negatively valent words, yet these same words were responded to in the least
amount of time when being “ignored”. Further discussion of these findings appears 
below. 
 
orrelations between UFOV task performance and verbal task reaction tim
65 
s nd in only two cases, significant. Correlations ranged from -.04 to .29; the only 
significant correlations were observed during the second and third UFOV subtests under 
the equal emphasis prioritization condition (r = .27and .29, respectively, both p < .05). 
These positive correlations, though weak, suggest that under true dual task demands, 
performance on one task was not compromised for the sake of performance on the other
That is, as performance on one task increased, performance on the other task increased
well. Correlations were weakest when ignoring the UFOV test, suggesting that 
performance on the two concurrent tasks most independent under this prioritization 
schedule, again supporting the notion that participants were able to effectively “
the visual attention task.  
 
 POC Curves for U
mall, a
. 
 as 
tune out” 
FOV Threshold and Verbal Task Reaction Time 
The first level of analysis (i.e., ANOVA and mean comparison of UFOV scores 
ritization level 
 
is 
e 
task paradigm. 
 
and verbal task RT in isolation) discussed above, found effects of both prio
and an interaction effect of prioritization level with the emotional properties of the given
words. This interaction revealed that high arousal negatively valent words were 
responded to with the greatest reaction time under true dual task conditions, yet were 
most effectively ignored. In addition to these findings, the POC method of analys
describes profound differences in participants’ ability to allocate attention to one or th
other task depending on the emotional properties of the given words. 
As mentioned above, the POC method is deigned to reveal the nature of the 
ability to allocate attention, or effort, to one or the other task in a dual 
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POC cu  first, rves for UFOV threshold plotted against verbal task reaction time during the
second, and third UFOV subtests appear as Figures 12, 13, and 14, below. 
 
Figure 12. POC curve plotting UFOV threshold against verbal task reaction time, during 
the first UFOV subtest. 
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Figure 13. POC curve plotting UFOV threshold against verbal task reaction time, during 
the second UFOV subtest. 
 
 
Figure 14. POC curve plotting UFOV threshold against verbal task reaction time, during 
the third UFOV subtest. 
68 
 
 
 Goodness-of-fit tests (R2) to a regression line for each of the curves can serve as 
a way to quantify the shape of the curve. However, for these patterns of data, which 
yielded atypical POC curves, goodness-of-fit tests is inappropriate and perhaps 
misleading. That is, the line that will be fit to the data does not adequately reflect the 
shape of these unique, and in some cases, vertical, POC curves. Thus, the shape of the 
POC curves will be discussed qualitatively rather than quantitatively.  
 As can be noted from the figures above, one robust pattern that emerges is the 
extreme concave shape of the POC curve yielded by participants who heard the high 
arousal negatively valent given words. That is, for each subtest of the UFOV, these POC 
curves appear in a “reverse numeral 7” shape. This shape suggests high performance on 
both tasks when ignoring the UFOV, low performance on the verbal task, yet high 
performance on the UFOV task when placing equal emphasis on both tasks, and reduced 
performance on the UFOV task with moderate performance on the verbal task when 
focusing on the UFOV task. This means that for this wordlist, participants did not ignore 
the UFOV when instructed to do so, yet focused on the UFOV when instructed to do so. 
Furthermore, these data mean that the dual task cost was absorbed to a greater level by 
the verbal task than the UFOV task.  
 These data partially support our hypothesis that high arousal negatively valent 
words would be most distracting to UFOV performance. In order to maintain a high level 
of performance on the UFOV task (as was observed in all other wordlist conditions, see 
above), reaction time to high arousal negatively valent words was compromised.  
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Verbal Task Data – Errors of Omission 
 Similar to the pattern of data observed for the UFOV task performance, there was 
a significant effect of concurrent UFOV task difficulty on verbal task errors of omission 
(expressed as the percent of possible responses that were omitted), F (2,128)= 8.0, p 
<.01, η2 = .11. However, post-hoc paired comparisons revealed that this effect was driven 
by frequent errors of omission during the third (i.e., most complex) UFOV subtest. 
Participants responded least often while performing the third UFOV subtest concurrently 
(M = 44% errors of omission), significantly less often than when performing the second 
UFOV subtest (M = 39.7% errors of omission, p < .01), and first UFOV subtest (M = 
38.3% errors of omission, p < .01). Verbal task performance during the first and second 
UFOV subtests did not significantly differ, p = .26. That is, the effect of concurrent 
UFOV task complexity on verbal task reaction time was only observed during the most 
complex UFOV subtest, just as was the case when considering verbal task response rate 
(though it should be noted that response rates of 4000 ms were entered for non-responses, 
making these data not independent). 
 Additionally, a significant main effect of attentional focus was observed, F (2, 
128) = 67.4, p < .01, η2 = .51. Participants responded least often when focused on the 
UFOV task (i.e., “ignoring” the verbal task), M = 61.6% errors of omission, see (Figure 
15, below), 
70 
 
Figure 15. Percentage of possible responses omitted under the “focus on the UFOV” 
prioritization condition. 
 
significantly less often than when devoting “equal” attention to both tasks, M = 29.3% 
errors of omission, p < .01, (see Figure 16, below), 
 
Figure 16. Percentage of possible responses omitted under the “equal emphasis” 
prioritization condition. 
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and when “ignoring” the UFOV task (i.e., focusing on the verbal task), M = 31% errors of 
omission, p < .01, (see Figure 17, below). 
 
Figure 17. Percentage of possible responses omitted under the “ignore UFOV” 
prioritization condition. 
 
 Response times under conditions of “ignoring” the UFOV and placing “equal” emphasis 
on both tasks did not differ significantly, p = .39. That is, again, while placing additional 
attention on the verbal task did not improve performance relative to placing equal 
attention on both tasks, participants were able to effectively “tune out” the verbal task, 
and diminish verbal task performance.  
 No effects of the emotional qualities of the given words in the verbal task were 
observed on verbal task response times. Neither emotional valence, F (1, 64) = .37, p = 
.55, nor emotional arousal level, F (1, 64) = .03, p = .87, demonstrated significant effects. 
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No interaction effects with UFOV subtest or attentional allocation level (or both) were 
observed (all p >.05). 
 
Correlations of Verbal Task Errors of Omission and UFOV Task Threshold 
 Correlations between UFOV task performance and verbal task errors of omission 
are listed in Table 3, below. Correlations between performance on the concurrent tasks 
were small, and in only one case, significant. Correlations ranged from -.15 to .2. As was 
the case with reaction time data, correlations were weakest when focusing on the UFOV 
test, suggesting that performance on the two concurrent tasks most independent under 
this prioritization schedule, again supporting the notion that participants were able to 
effectively “tune out” the verbal task.  
 
 Verbal Task Data – Accuracy 
 Accuracy scores were, as mentioned above, assessed by to raters who judges the 
similarity in meaning of the given word and the verbal response. Similarity was judged 
on a 7 point Likert scale, with a score of 1 reflecting “strongly unrelated” and a score of 7 
reflecting “strongly related”. Correlations between the mean ratings for participants 
within levels of the UFOV subtest and prioritization schedule provided by the two raters 
appear in Table 5. All correlations were significant (p < .01), and all had values of +.90 
or greater. For each given word / response pair, the mean rating was determined. This 
rating was then dichotomized: responses with a mean rating of 3.5 or greater were judged 
to be related, responses with a mean rating of less than 3.5 were judged to be unrelated. 
Finally, the percentage of all responses that were judged to be related was determined.  
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 Again, there was not a significant effect of concurrent UFOV task difficulty on 
verbal accuracy, F (2, 212)= .13, p = .88, η2 < .01. Thus, the complexity of the concurrent 
UFOV task did not affect the accuracy of the words produced by participants. However, a 
significant, and notably large, main effect of attentional focus was observed, F (2, 212) = 
42.5, p < .001, η2 = .6. As might be expected, participants responded least accurately 
when focusing on the UFOV task (i.e., ignoring the verbal task) (M = 41.3%), (see Figure 
18, below), 
 
Figure 18. Percent of responses made that were judged to be “related” during the 
“ignore the UFOV” prioritization schedule.  
 
 
 significantly less accurate than when placing equal emphasis on both tasks (M = 85%), 
see Figure 19, below), 
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Figure 19. Percent of responses made that were judged to be “related” during the 
“equal emphasis” prioritization schedule. 
 
 and when focusing on the verbal task (M = 86.1%), (see Figure 20, below). 
 
Figure 20. Percent of responses made that were judged to be “related” during the 
“ignore the UFOV” prioritization schedule. 
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 Accuracy did not significantly differ between conditions of equal emphasis and focusing 
on the verbal task, p > .05. Again, participants appear to be able to “tune out” the verbal 
task effectively, but do not experience a direct overall cost in performance when dividing 
attention relative to focusing attention on the verbal task.  
 No main effects of emotion were observed. There was no main effect of the 
emotional category of words presented to participants, F (3, 53) = 2.4, p = .07, η2 = .12. 
That is, participants responded with equivalent accuracy (or relatedness) regardless of the 
emotional properties of the given words.  
 
Correlations of Verbal Task Accuracy and UFOV Task Threshold 
 Correlations between UFOV task performance and verbal task accuracy are listed 
in Table 4, below. Ranged from -.291 to .184, and were significant in two instances. 
Under the prioritization condition of placing equal emphasis on both tasks, and during the 
first and second UFOV tasks, correlations were -.291 and -.329, respectively (both p < 
.01). Thus, whereas verbal task reaction time yielded positive correlations with UFOV 
threshold, verbal task accuracy yielded negative correlations with UFOV performance. 
However, this is again consistent with a lack of tradeoff in performance from one task to 
another, as higher accuracy scores and lower thresholds are both indicative of better task 
performance. That is, as UFOV thresholds increased (i.e., poor performance), the 
percentage of accurate (or related) responses decreased (i.e., poor performance).  
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POC Curves for UFOV Threshold and Verbal Task Accuracy Ratings 
 The first level of analysis (i.e., ANOVA and mean comparison of UFOV scores 
and verbal task accuracy in isolation), as discussed above, found no main effects of the 
emotional properties of the given words on verbal task accuracy (i.e., relatedness of the 
responses). Furthermore, the only significant main effect, found for the prioritization 
level of the two tasks, was such that ignoring the UFOV (i.e., focusing on the verbal task) 
improved performance, but there was no significant difference between placing equal 
emphasis on both tasks and focusing on the UFOV (i.e., ignoring the verbal task). That is, 
no dual task cost was noted when considering verbal task accuracy. This lack of a dual 
task cost created unique POC curves.  
Figures 21, 22, and 23 (see below) display the POC curves obtained by plotting 
UFOV thresholds for the first, second, and third UFOV subtests, respectively, against 
accuracy ratings in the verbal task. Again, due to the atypical shape of these POC curves, 
goodness-of-fit tests to quantify linearity are inappropriate and misleading.  
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Figure 21. POC curve plotting UFOV threshold against verbal task accuracy ratings, 
during the first UFOV subtest. 
 
 
Figure 22. POC curve plotting UFOV threshold against verbal task accuracy ratings, 
during the second UFOV subtest. 
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Figure 23. POC curve plotting UFOV threshold against verbal task accuracy ratings, 
during the third UFOV subtest. 
 
These POC curves can be summarized, clearly, as linear, but in the opposite 
direction than is typically observed. The lack of a dual task cost in verbal task accuracy 
created POC curves with essentially two points, rather than the intended three. In each of 
the graphs above, there is a cluster of points for the “focus on the UFOV” prioritization 
condition, and a single cluster of points for both the “place equal emphasis on both tasks” 
and “ignore the UFOV” condition. Thus, the POC curves connect, in essence only two 
points, resulting in a line, rather than a curve. Nonetheless, these POC curves reflect the 
lack of a performance gain with regard to verbal task accuracy when focusing on the 
verbal task. 
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 NASA TLX Data 
 Overall TLX Scores 
 There was no effect of attentional prioritization on TLX index scores, F (2, 152) = 
1.3, p = .28, η2 = .02. Participants did not rate the task load of the dual task significantly 
differently under conditions of focusing on the UFOV (M = 69.1), placing equal 
emphasis on both tasks (M = 67.3), or ignoring the UFOV (M = 59.7). Furthermore, there 
was no effect of wordlist category on TLX index scores, F (3, 76) = .78, p = .51, η2 = .03. 
That is, participants did not rate the task load of the dual task significantly differently 
when hearing high arousal negatively valent words (M = 72), high arousal positively 
valent words (M = 65.4), low arousal negatively valent words (M = 64.6), or low arousal 
positively valent words (M = 59.5). The dual-task scenario was thus rated as having 
essentially equal task load (or cognitive demand) regardless of the attentional 
prioritization or wordlist employed. 
 TLX Performance Scores 
 Similarly, there was no effect of attentional prioritization on TLX “Performance” 
scores, F (2, 152) = .93, p = .4, η2 = .01. Participants did not rate their overall 
performance of the dual task significantly differently under conditions of focusing on the 
UFOV (M = 51.6), placing equal emphasis on both tasks (M = 48), or ignoring the UFOV 
(M = 48.6). Furthermore, there was no effect of wordlist category on TLX index scores, F 
(3, 76) = .55, p = .65, η2 = .02. That is, participants did not rate the task load of the dual 
task significantly differently when hearing high arousal negatively valent words (M = 
46.9), high arousal positively valent words (M = 49.5), low arousal negatively valent 
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words (M = 52.7), or low arousal positively valent words (M = 48.5). Participants felt 
they performed equally well under each of these conditions. 
 Correlations between TLX Performance Scores and UFOV Thresholds 
 Under the condition of ignoring the UFOV task, correlations between TLX 
performance ratings and UFOV thresholds were small, negative, and nonsignificant. TLX 
performance scores correlated with the first, second, and third UFOV subtest thresholds 
at -.18, -.15, and -.18, respectively.  
 When focusing on the UFOV task, a similar, yet weaker pattern of correlations 
was observed. TLX performance scores correlated with the first, second, and third UFOV 
subtest thresholds at -.05, -.02, and -.07, respectively, in this condition. 
 When placing equal emphasis on both tasks, as was hypothesized, correlations 
were again weak, but now positive. TLX performance scores correlated with the first, 
second, and third UFOV subtest thresholds at .12, .08, and .09, respectively, in this 
condition. While interpreting small, nonsignificant correlations should be done with 
caution, it is compelling that in all other instances, a negative correlation between 
subjective rating of performance and UFOV performance was exhibited. It may be the 
case that participants are (to a small degree) best able to assess their UFOV task 
performance under conditions of emphasizing both tasks. 
 Correlations between TLX Performance Scores and Verbal Task Accuracy 
 Under the condition of ignoring the UFOV task, correlations between TLX 
performance ratings and verbal task accuracy were weak, negative, and nonsignificant. At 
this prioritization schedule, TLX performance scores correlated with verbal task accuracy 
during the first, second, and third concurrent UFOV subtests at -.16, -.07, and -.05, 
81 
respectively. Thus, a weak relationship between perceived performance and actual 
performance existed when ignoring the UFOV task.  
 When placing equal emphasis on both tasks, correlations were notably weaker, 
and not significant. TLX performance scores correlated with the first, second, and third 
UFOV subtest thresholds at -.05, -.005, and -.05, respectively, in this condition. As was 
the case during the “ignore the UFOV” prioritization schedule, no relationship between 
perceived performance and actual performance was observed during the “equal 
emphasis” prioritization schedule. 
 However, when focusing on the UFOV task, a moderate and significant pattern of 
correlations was exhibited. TLX performance scores correlated with verbal task accuracy 
ratings during the first, second, and third concurrent UFOV subtests at .41, .48, and .49, 
respectively, in this condition. These were the strongest correlations with the TLX 
performance ratings in any category, and each were significant (p < .01). Thus, it may be 
the case that participants are able to most accurately judge their verbal task performance 
under conditions of ignoring the verbal task (i.e., when ignoring the words, they are 
aware of their lack of performance). 
Discussion 
Support for hypotheses 
 Although the effects of negatively valent emotional verbal tasks were not found in 
a robust manner, the current study demonstrated compelling effects, and support for 
many of our hypotheses, mentioned above. Specifically, there is evidence to support the 
hypothesis of a dual-task cost, the hypothesis of verbal task interference with visual 
attention, the hypothesis that differing emotional characteristics of the given words will 
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affect the shape of POC curves, and the hypothesis that weak positive correlations will 
exist between TLX ratings and task performance. 
 The hypothesis of a dual task cost was supported by a significant effect of 
attentional prioritization on UFOV thresholds. Though smaller than some dual-task costs 
we’ve induced in our lab, and smaller than observed in the pilot data, participants 
exhibited larger UFOV thresholds (M = 64 ms) when devoting “equal” attention to both 
tasks than when focusing on the UFOV (M = 35 ms), meaning that the UFOV stimuli had 
to remain on the screen nearly twice as long under “true” dual task conditions relative to, 
essentially, single task conditions. The additional finding that much larger UFOV 
thresholds were found when participants were told to “ignore” the UFOV (M = 223 ms), 
suggests that participants were effective at attenuating processing of the visual stimuli. 
That is, they showed a greater difference between focusing on both tasks and ignoring the 
UFOV task than between focusing on both tasks and focusing on the UFOV task. 
 Likewise, the hypothesis of a dual task cost was supported by a significant effect 
of attentional prioritization on verbal task reaction time and errors of omission. 
Participants took longer to respond when dividing attention between tasks equally than 
when focusing on the verbal task (Ms = 1230 and 1123 ms, respectively), responded less 
often when dividing attention than when focusing on the verbal task (Ms = 61.6% errors 
and 29.3% errors of omission, respectively). Additionally, participants responded less 
accurately when ignoring the verbal task than when dividing attention (Ms = 41.3% and 
85%, respectively), suggesting that participants were able to “tune out” the verbal task, 
and diminish performance, perhaps allowing for improved performance on the UFOV 
task.  
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 The hypothesis that the shape of the POC curves would be affected by emotional 
properties of the given words in the verbal task was supported as well, in a similar 
manner to that which was hypothesized. It was hypothesized that high arousal negatively 
valent words would yield the most linear POC curves, and that high arousal positively 
valent words would yield the most convex POC curves. Instead, high arousal negatively 
valent words yielded a concave POC curve in the case of reaction time POCs. That is, 
there was a unique ability for subjects in this condition to maintain UFOV task 
performance at a high level by sacrificing verbal task performance, at a dramatically 
greater level than for the other emotional conditions. This, coupled with the traditional 
analysis findings that high arousal negatively valent words yielded reaction times that 
were greatest of any emotional category during the “equal emphasis” prioritization 
condition support the hypothesis that high arousal negatively valent words are especially 
distracting to visual attention performance. 
 However, the unique shape of the reaction time POC curves, and the linear shape 
of the accuracy POC curves, suggest that for these particular task measures, the 
Performance Operating Characteristic method may not be suitable. That is, the sensitivity 
of these tasks and their measures may not yield typical POC curves. The range of scores, 
particularly for the verbal task dependent measures, was not large. Furthermore, little 
difference was observed between various combinations of the prioritization levels. If 
POC curves are to yield fruitful interpretations, more sensitive measures which 
differentiate performance at these prioritization levels must be employed. 
Additionally, the hypothesis that NASA TLX ratings of task difficulty and task 
performance would be weakly, yet positively correlated with actual performance was 
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partially supported. Participants demonstrated strongest correlations between TLX ratings 
and UFOV threshold under the condition of placing equal emphasis on both verbal and 
UFOV tasks. Though the correlations were weak, it could mean, counterintuitively, that a 
better estimate of UFOV performance can be made under dual task conditions than when 
focusing on the UFOV. This may be due to participants understanding that UFOV 
performance suffers under dual task demands relative to focusing on the UFOV, and 
accurately reducing their subjective performance ratings (though this difference was not 
significant, it may have affected these weak correlations). Furthermore, stronger positive 
correlations between subjective NASA TLX ratings and verbal task accuracy were 
observed when participants focused on the UFOV task (i.e., when they ignored the verbal 
task). That is, participants most accurately rated their overall performance when they 
could “factor out” verbal task performance, or account for poor verbal task performance. 
When participants ignored the verbal task, they accurately described their performance 
decrease. The fact that these correlations were larger may indicate that participants’ 
performance ratings were driven more by verbal task performance than by UFOV task 
performance. This may have important implications for drivers conversing on a cellular 
phone, as they may judge their overall performance based largely on the quality of their 
conversation. 
Implications 
 The current study demonstrated, in agreement with a wealth of dual task 
literature, that there is a notable effect of verbal tasks on visual attention. The Useful 
Field of View, or the extent (either in terms of spatial attention or efficiency) to which 
information can be extracted from a visual scene and used to guide action, is substantially 
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impacted by the presence of a concurrent verbal task. Whereas none of the participants 
yielded UFOV scores that predict increased accident risk while focusing on the UFOV 
task, 19% of these same participants yielded UFOV scores that predict greater than 
double the risk of getting into an injurious accident when performing a concurrent verbal 
task. Fifteen subjects demonstrated this increased risk prediction, six in the low arousal 
negative valence wordlist condition, five in the high arousal positive valence wordlist 
condition, three in the low arousal positive valence wordlist condition, and one in the 
high arousal negative valence wordlist condition. 
These data add support to a growing corpus of research that suggests that the type 
of conversation (or verbal task) carried out concurrently with a driving (or visual 
attention) task can affect visual attention performance. Clearly, there are differences in 
the dual task demands created by the different wordlists used in this experiment.  
In summary, participants seem to be able to effectively “tune out” one or the other 
task in a dual task paradigm, though traditional analyses and POC analyses converge to 
inform us that under these experimental conditions (which may not require adequate 
cognitive load), UFOV performance is not as greatly impacted by concurrent verbal tasks 
as pilot data and theory suggest. While smaller than expected, these dual task costs have 
implications in an applied setting, as 19% of subjects exhibited UFOV scores under dual 
task conditions that would predict more than double the risk of injurious accident. 
Finally, highly arousing negatively valent verbal stimuli may be the most distracting 
category of emotional verbal tasks (i.e., proto-conversations) to have while driving. This 
is congruent with behavioral (e.g., Easterbrook, 1959), neurophysiological (e.g., Bradley, 
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et al., 2003), and evolutionary (e.g., Davidson, 2003) theories regarding the nature of 
emotional stimuli and attention. 
 
Directions for further study 
 As mentioned above, the manipulations of task load via prioritization schedules 
implemented in this study may not have been sufficient to tease apart robust differences 
found in task performance between emotional properties of the given words. In addition 
to adjusting prioritization schedules, verbal task load can be manipulated in many other 
ways. Potential manipulations include, but are not limited to: adjusting the concreteness 
or abstractness of the given words and intended responses, adjusting frequency of 
occurrence of the given words (i.e., participants could be asked to respond to either very 
obscure words or very common words), adjusting the semantic neighborhood set size of 
the given words, or adding various levels of auditory noise to the given word signal. 
 By using additional methods of manipulating task load of the verbal task, not only 
can the robustness of the interference effects discussed in this dissertation be assessed, 
but more specific mechanisms of language processing can be weighed as contributing to 
the interference with visual attention performance. Furthermore, tasks that more closely 
resemble real, natural conversations can be used (still employing varying degrees of 
experimental control and manipulation) can and should be employed, making the link 
between cellular phone use and driving accidents more valid. The current study employed 
a set of “verbal tasks”, but lacked the planning, the syntax, the predictability and “cloze” 
features of naturalistic conversation. Investigation to cognitive mechanisms of language 
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processing which interfere with visual attention would do well to include these features in 
their design and manipulations. 
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Table 1. 
Appearance of Four Key Design Elements in Articles Cited in Literature Review 
Author “Driving” task 1 2 3 4 
Atchley, P. & Dressel (2004) UFOV  Yes No Both tasks  No 
Amado & Ulpinar (2005) Attention tasks Yes No Conversation task No 
Briem & Hedman (1995) Pursuit-tracking No No Both tasks No 
Brown, et al. (1969) On-road Yes No Driving task No 
Consiglio, et al. (2003) Simple RT No No Both tasks No 
Horberry, et al. (2006) Simulator Yes No Driving task Yes 
Horswill & McKenna (1999)  Simulator Yes No Driving task No 
Jamson, et al. (2004) Simulator Yes No Driving task No 
Lee, et al. (2001) Simulator Yes No Both tasks Yes 
McCarley, et al. (2004) Change blindness No No Conversation task No 
McKnight & McKnight (1993) Simulator No No Both tasks No 
Rakauskas, et al. (2004) Simulator Yes No Both tasks Yes 
Recarte & Nunes (2000) Eyetracking No No Both tasks No 
Shinar, et al. (2005) Simulator Yes No Both tasks Yes 
Strayer & Drews (2004) Simulator No No Driving task No 
Strayer & Johnston (2001) Pursuit-tracking No No Driving task No 
Strayer, et al. (2003) Simulator No No Driving task No 
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Table 2. 
 
Correlations between UFOV task thresholds and verbal task reaction time (separated by 
UFOV subtest, such that concurrent tasks are displayed together). 
 
Ignore UFOV Condition    
 RT During UFOV 1 RT During UFOV 2 RT During UFOV 3
UFOV 1 Threshold .009
UFOV 2 Threshold .046
UFOV 3 Threshold -.039
 
Equal Emphasis Condition 
 RT During UFOV 1 RT During UFOV 2 RT During UFOV 3
UFOV 1 Threshold .226
UFOV 2 Threshold .273*
UFOV 3 Threshold .29*
 
Focus on UFOV Condition 
 RT During UFOV 1 RT During UFOV 2 RT During UFOV 3
UFOV 1 Threshold .129
UFOV 2 Threshold .281
UFOV 3 Threshold -.026
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Table 3. 
 
Correlations between UFOV task thresholds and verbal task errors of omission 
(separated by UFOV subtest, such that concurrent tasks are displayed together). 
 
Ignore UFOV Condition    
 Omit During UFOV 1 Omit During UFOV 2 Omit During UFOV 3
UFOV 1 Threshold -0.11  
UFOV 2 Threshold -0.09 
UFOV 3 Threshold  -0.15
  
Equal Emphasis Condition  
 Omit During UFOV 1 Omit During UFOV 2 Omit During UFOV 3
UFOV 1 Threshold -0.05  
UFOV 2 Threshold 0.02 
UFOV 3 Threshold  0.20
  
Focus on UFOV Condition  
 Omit During UFOV 1 Omit During UFOV 2 Omit During UFOV 3
UFOV 1 Threshold 0.08  
UFOV 2 Threshold -0.11 
UFOV 3 Threshold  0.03
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Table 4. 
 
Correlations between UFOV task thresholds and verbal task accuracy ratings (separated 
by UFOV subtest, such that concurrent tasks are displayed together). 
 
Ignore UFOV Condition    
 Acc. During UFOV 1 Acc. During UFOV 2 Acc. During UFOV 3
UFOV 1 Threshold -.025  
UFOV 2 Threshold .02 
UFOV 3 Threshold  -.004
  
Equal Emphasis Condition  
 Acc. During UFOV 1 Acc. During UFOV 2 Acc. During UFOV 3
UFOV 1 Threshold -.291**  
UFOV 2 Threshold -.329** 
UFOV 3 Threshold  -.146
  
Focus on UFOV Condition  
 Acc. During UFOV 1 Acc. During UFOV 2 Acc. During UFOV 3
UFOV 1 Threshold .038  
UFOV 2 Threshold .184 
UFOV 3 Threshold  .031
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Table 5.  
 
Correlations between mean similarity scores for participants, within UFOV condition 
and attentional prioritization condition. 
 
Focus on UFOV Condition    
 Rater 2 
 UFOV 1 UFOV 2 UFOV 3 
Rater 1    
UFOV 1 .993**
UFOV 2 .997**
UFOV 3 0.968**
    
Equal Emphasis Condition    
 Rater 2 
 UFOV 1 UFOV 2 UFOV 3 
Rater 1    
UFOV 1 .935**
UFOV 2 .939**
UFOV 3 .948**
    
Ignore UFOV Condition    
 Rater 2 
 UFOV 1 UFOV 2 UFOV 3 
Rater 1    
UFOV 1 .917**
UFOV 2 .901**
UFOV 3 .955**
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 Appendix 
Negative Valence Negative Valence Positive Valence Positive Valence 
High Arousal Low Arousal High Arousal Low Arousal 
abuse lie ache massacre admired orgasm adorable palace 
accident mad addicted measles adventure outstanding agreement paradise 
afraid murderer alone misery affection party angel peace 
agony mutilate anguished mistake aroused passion bath pillow 
ambulance nightmare blister morbid beautiful profit beauty politeness 
anger pain bored morgue birthday promotion bed protected 
angry pervert burial mosquito brave rescue bird rainbow 
annoy poison cemetery neglect car riches bless refreshment
assault pollute coffin obesity cash rollercoaster blossom respect 
bankrupt punishment corpse paralysis cheer romantic brother respectful 
betray quarrel coward penalty christmas sex bunny reward 
blackmail rabies crime poverty confident sexy butterfly safe 
bloody rage criminal pus couple skijump cake sailboat 
bomb rape crisis rotten dazzle song capable satisfied 
brutal rejected death sad desire success carefree scholar 
burn riot defeated scum dollar sunlight caress secure 
cancer roach deformed shamed ecstasy surprised color sky 
cockroach rude depressed sick elated talent comfort sleep 
crash scalding depression slime engaged terrific cozy snuggle 
crucify scared disappoint slum erotic thrill cuddle soft 
danger sinful discomfort stench excitement travel devoted soothe 
demon slap disgusted stupid exercise treasure dignified spouse 
despise slaughter failure tomb fame triumphant earth sun 
destroy slave fat trash festive valentine easy sunrise 
detest stress fever ugly fireworks victory easygoing sunset 
devil suffocate filth unhappy flirt win elegant truth 
disaster surgery flabby useless fun  enjoyment twilight 
disloyal terrible foul waste gift  family untroubled 
distressed terrified funeral  graduate  fantasy useful 
divorce terrorist garbage  happy  free warmth 
drown thief germs  heart  friendly wise 
enraged tornado gloom  holiday  gentle wish 
fear torture grief  intercourse  grateful  
fearful toxic hardship  intimate  grin  
guillotine tragedy headache  joke  heal  
guilty trauma hell  joy  home  
hate troubled helpless  kiss  honest  
hatred tumor illness  laughter  house  
horror ulcer impotent  leader  kind  
hostage unfaithful infection  love  kindness  
hostile vandal lice  loved  loyal  
humiliate venom loneliness  lucky  luxury  
insult victim lonely  lust  masterful  
intruder violent loser  memories  melody  
jealousy war louse  millionaire  music  
killer wicked maggot  miracle  nature  
leprosy  malaria  mother  ocean  
